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The world’s third largest retailer, Ahold, has based most of its international growth on 
acquisitions and appeared to be highly successful, with a clear strategic logic of acquiring 
upscale, often family-owned, well regarded regional chains (Business Week, 2000) and by 
being a "learning company" (Barkema, 2004). Ahold has had a policy of buying healthy 
companies with sound management, using their global presence to streamline their operations, 
while retaining a strong local identity, implementing the 'best practices' of one chain in other 
chains across the globe, and lending acquired companies its logistical capabilities (Barkema, 
2004, Business Week 2000, 2004). Its management believed it had developed a unique 
capability of screening, selecting, and implementing acquisitions, perfecting its criteria and 
procedures to the point of being the best in the business (Barkema, 2004). However, Ahold was 
not aware of the fact that it underestimated the problems of entering different cultures (such as 
China, Argentina and Spain where many mistakes were made) and different (even related) 
industries (like for example the wholesale business in the US) and rushed into different foreign 
markets and industries confidently, all of which ended with dramatic results at the beginning of 
2003 (Barkema, 2004, Business Week, 2004).  
The story of Ahold is not exceptional or unrecognizable in today’s world. Undoubtedly 
acquisitions have become one of the major strategic tools for growth of multinational 
corporations (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993, Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998). Cross border 
mergers and acquisitions activity has continued to increase at a high pace during the past 
decade and a half and after a few years of decline, with rising stock markets, interest on debt at 
low levels and the recovering economy, the size and number of international acquisitions is 
rising again (UNCTAD, 2005).  
However, as Ahold and many others learned the hard way, acquisitions involve 
problems, including coordinating and reconfiguring resources in an internationally dispersed 
network, transferring best practice across units, retaining key personnel and exchanging 
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knowledge across geographically dispersed units (Anderson, Havila & Salmi, 2001, Cannella 
& Hambrick, 1993) and a lot of them fail or underperform (Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992, 
Jensen, 1988, Markides & Oyon, 1998, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  
Many companies understand today that they need unique capabilities to create and 
sustain a competitive advantage and to achieve superior performance in terms of their 
acquisitions, especially if they are to compete in a diverse and quickly changing world 
(Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998). While it is known and accepted that learning from 
experience is one of the key ways of building such repositories of routines and knowledge 
(Cyert & March, 1963, Levitt & March, 1988, Levinthal & March, 1993, March, 1991, Nelson 
& Winter, 1982), our understanding of the relationship between acquisition experience and 
performance is not complete. Previous research has shown, for example, that the higher the 
experience with acquiring, the better the performance of the acquisitions will be (Fowler & 
Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). At the same 
time other research claims that experience with acquisitions does not help to build the 
acquisition skills (Lahaey & Conn, 1990, Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Zollo & Singh, 2002). 
Finally, Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) suggest that the relation between acquisitions’ 
experience and performance might be different for different levels of experience. Questions 
regarding which experiences could be useful for acquiring companies and in what way 
internationalizing companies benefit from them are still unanswered. This study aims to fill 
this gap by focusing on both the process of international expansion (frequency of 
international expansion by acquisitions) (c.f. Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002) as well as the 
acquisitions’ successfulness.  
In chapter 2 we analyze what experiences could be helpful in learning to acquire 
internationally and how companies learn to use them. We argue that in order to become a 
successful acquirer, companies have to learn two skills. The first one is to be efficient and 
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effective by developing routines for acquiring companies abroad. The second skill is to 
determine which routines should be applied to which problems and to which settings, in order 
to avoid misattribution of the prior experience (c.f. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999, Levitt & 
March, 1988). We find that having the first type of routines (the “efficiency” routine) in place 
helps companies to increase the frequency of their acquisitions. Initially, however, 
internationalizing companies are not able to align the two kinds routines with each other, which 
causes a decline in foreign acquisitions performance. Finally, we suggest that when making 
international acquisitions, companies could benefit from their prior experience with 
international and domestic acquisitions as well as international joint ventures.  
The findings of chapter 2 triggered a question regarding why is it that firms increase the 
frequency of acquiring abroad even though the right routines are not yet in place and 
companies are not fully equipped and skilled to do so. We deal with this issue more extensively 
in chapter 3. First, we develop an argument regarding how various managerial biases at 
different levels of the company’s acquisition experience influence the behavior of managers 
reflected in the number of foreign acquisitions per year that they are making. We suggest that 
underestimation of problems related to international acquisitions and overconfidence creates a 
tendency for companies to rush with international acquisitions, which is, in fact, increasing the 
likelihood of costly mistakes being made and acquisitions failing. When the accumulated 
problems can no longer be ignored, failed acquisitions are sold off, and companies learn. After 
this phase, foreign acquisitions ascend to higher levels than before, this time with an increasing 
success rate, making untimely international acquisitions’ divestitures increasingly unlikely. 
Second, we propose that international greenfields could also be a source of valuable experience 
for international acquirers and apply the mechanism of how international acquirers learn to 
acquire abroad to learning from previous experience with foreign greenfields as well.  
Introduction 
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Finally, in chapter 4 we concentrate on the issue regarding how firms become 
successful with international horizontal acquisitions and how it is influenced by the prior 
experience with international horizontal and related acquisitions. We argue that firms acquiring 
in their core business abroad benefit from their prior international horizontal acquisitions as 
they provide the relevant information about the new foreign markets and cultures. Learning 
from international related acquisitions to make horizontal acquisitions abroad, requires more 
time, as next to dealing with new foreign markets, companies have to learn to transfer the 
knowledge from their related businesses. We find, however, that firms experienced in 
acquiring abroad in their core business are able to benefit from their experience with related 
acquisitions more easily. 
Overall, by looking at both frequency and successfulness of acquisitions, the research 
presented in this thesis contributes to understating the process of international expansion by 
acquisitions. A core idea proposed and developed in this thesis, which is consistent with 
anecdotal evidence and with prior research, is that inappropriate generalizations of various 
types of prior experience are pervasive in the field of International Business, particularly for 
companies in the early stages of internationalization (see Perlmutter, 1969), and that those 
generalizations (as well as overconfidence stemming from them) are at the root of many failed 
foreign expansions. This leads to new theory, applied to the case of international acquisitions. 
Our theory treats the frequency and the success of international acquisitions separately, both 
conceptually and empirically. We develop the idea that the pace of the acquisition process 
increases with a company’s experience, as cognitive effort is replaced by routines. In addition, 
we propose, building on the work of Levitt and March (1988) and Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1999), that the success rate of international acquisitions first decreases as the company 
misattributes previously acquired routines to new acquisitions but later increases as firms learn 
and develop the two essential types of routines (chapter 2), overcome hubris (chapter 3) or 
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learn how to transfer their knowledge from different (product and geographical) markets 
(chapter 4). Furthermore, we extend the implicit idea of previous research that companies only 
benefit from the same type of experience, i.e., only from international acquisitions when doing 
subsequent international acquisitions, to the idea that a whole array of previous experiences 
and routines can enhance the success of later expansions. We show that in managing 
international acquisitions firms may inappropriately attempt to use applications which have 
only surface similarities to previous acquisitions with routines developed from not only 
international acquisitions, but also from domestic acquisitions, of international joint ventures, 
international greenfields, as well as finer grained international acquisition experience (i.e. with 
foreign horizontal and related acquisitions). Hence, our study implies that knowledge and 
routines that previously perceived as helpful can, in fact, be treacherous, at least initially, and 
conversely seemingly different types of knowledge and routines, such as from domestic 
acquisitions, international joint ventures and greenfields can actually prove useful. The novel 
mechanisms uncovered in our study are important both from a theoretical perspective and from 
a practical angle. It might also have application beyond the domain of IB as companies are 
increasingly confronted with competitors introducing innovations in the domain of products, 
marketing, technology, and business models, rendering the domain of existing applications 
increasingly limited.  
 
















In this paper we analyze what kind of experiences are needed by internationalizing companies 
to increase the successfulness of their international acquisitions over time. By testing the 
learning effects in two ways (i.e. by the frequency with which foreign acquisitions are made 
and by their successfulness) we provide an explanation of the relationship between learning 
from experience and foreign acquisition performance. Our results suggest that firms do not 
have one optimal speed of foreign expansion that remains fixed over their lifetime – we 
propose that when firms learn the pace of foreign expansions they can successfully increase. 
We also show that internationalizing firms might benefit from their experiences with domestic 
and foreign acquisitions as well as with foreign joint ventures when learning to make 
international acquisitions.  




Opening markets and digitization are pulling large corporations as well as small and medium-
sized enterprises beyond their national borders and into a race against rivals in their industry to 
reach new foreign countries and regions first (Barkema, Baum & Mannix, 2002, Ghoshal, 
1987, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). One of the fastest ways to establish a presence in a 
foreign market is to buy a company in that market (King et al., 2004). To be able to keep up 
with the changing world and with the fierce competition and in order to overtake and outgrow 
the competitors, internationalizing companies face the challenge of learning to make 
international acquisitions frequently. However, pursuing an acquisition strategy as a way to 
enter foreign markets is risky and many acquisitions turn out to be unsuccessful (Datta, Pinches 
& Narayanan, 1992, Jensen, 1988, Markides & Oyon, 1998, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987), end in financial losses and divestures, or with damaged reputations of the 
acquiring firm and its managers (Bergh, 2001, Donaldson, 1990, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). 
The question is how firms can learn to acquire internationally? What experiences might prove 
useful for them? How often can internationalizing MNC acquire and yet stay successful?  
Previous research has begun to answer these questions by concentrating mostly on 
learning from the companies’ acquisitions experience (without making a distinction between 
foreign and domestic acquisitions; or in a domestic setting), that could potentially provide a 
basis for skills related to selecting and integrating an acquisition partner (Burton, Oviatt & 
White, 1994, Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Lahaey & Conn, 
1990, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001, Zollo & Singh, 2002). To be successful in acquiring 
internationally, however, firms also need to master the skills of choosing and integrating the 
foreign targets and managing affiliates dispersed in unfamiliar foreign environments. Yet, 
although quite a vast body of literature is devoted to learning from acquisition experience, not 
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much focus has been placed on other possible sources of experience and knowledge that 
companies could benefit from to obtain the skills for making their international acquisitions 
(like for example experience with domestic acquisitions or foreign joint ventures).  
Previous literature has pointed to several problems that firms might face when learning 
from their prior experience with acquisitions. First of all, due to a high probability of 
misattribution of previous acquisition experience (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), the firms’ 
ability to benefit and learn from that experience is (at least initially) constrained. The second 
problem is how frequently companies can acquire and stay successful. When a firm expands 
internationally by making acquisitions, for example, it can move fast by acquiring additional 
companies one after another, or even simultaneously, to gain market share and to establish a 
strong position in a relatively short period of time. Alternatively, it can take a more cautious 
approach, and not make subsequent acquisitions until it has accumulated more local 
experience, until market uncertainty becomes substantially reduced or until it has fully 
integrated the previously acquired companies. Organizational learning theory and 
internationalization theory suggest that companies have one optimal speed of expanding with a 
fixed number of expansions per year over time (Hayward, 2002, Vermeulen & Barkema, 
2002), that allows them to learn from their previous experience and avoid the problems related 
to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). As a result, research in that stream 
has taken a static approach to analyzing this problem and, thus, might not explain what the 
effect of learning, gaining and accumulating experience is in terms of the frequency of 
expanding.  
In this paper we propose that in order to understand how organizations learn from their 
experiences it is not only important to consider how experienced a firm is at a particular point 
in time but also how many acquisitions companies can absorb to build workable and usable 
routines over time. Analyzing these two factors simultaneously might help to understand more 
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precisely why misattribution of experiences occurs, and what consequences it has for the 
behavior of a firm (i.e. how frequently the acquisitions are made) and performance of foreign 
acquisitions.  
In this paper we build on the idea that when firms learn they develop two types of 
routines (c.f. Levitt & March, 1988). The first sort allows them to increase the efficiency of 
their acquisition process (automatize certain tasks and improve in performing them, etc.) that is 
built relatively easily and quickly and helps to increase the frequency of acquiring abroad. The 
second type of routines that companies have to develop helps them to routinely determine 
which routines should be applied to which problems and to which settings (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999, Levitt & March, 1988), yet is harder and more difficult to learn. We suggest 
that for inexperienced acquirers, when the second type of routine is not yet developed, the 
increase in the frequency of international expansion by acquisitions causes the decrease of their 
performance. We argue further that as internationalizing firms gain experience, they are able to 
develop those two sets of routines that jointly allow them to acquire more frequently and 
successfully at the same time. This in turn implies that there is not one optimal speed of 
international expansion by acquisitions that is stable over the lifetime of a company. Thus, 
through testing the learning effects in two ways (i.e. frequency and performance) we provide 
the explanation of the relationship between learning from experience and foreign acquisition 
performance.  
Finally, our study attempts to identify other potential experiences that influence 
acquisition performance and from which internationalizing companies could learn to acquire 
internationally. First of all, as already mentioned, we suggest that firms that acquire abroad 
might benefit from their previous experience with foreign acquisitions. Secondly, we argue that 
skills related to selecting and cooperating with a partner (without dealing with the complexities 
of operating abroad) could be developed by learning from their domestic acquisitions. Finally, 
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we suggest that international joint ventures might help international acquirers to develop 
routines on how to cooperate with a foreign partner and how to deal with foreign 




Acquisitions offer one of the fastest means of building a substantial presence in a foreign 
market (King et al., 2004). They help firms to achieve greater market power, overcome barriers 
of entry, enter new foreign markets quickly and finally to acquire new knowledge and 
resources (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). At the same time, benefiting from the potential 
opportunities that international acquisitions offer, poses a real challenge for internationalizing 
companies. The main difficulties come from the fact that the firm is exposed to diverse tastes, 
preferences, languages, cultures, business systems and practices typical for a foreign country 
and/or foreign partners in that country (Barkema et al., 1996, Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
Furthermore, firms pursuing acquisitions might encounter problems associated with the 
integration of acquisitions (Haspelagh & Jemison, 1991, Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), which is 
complicated by the differences in organizational cultures and management styles of the 
organizations involved, threats of layoffs, initial inequalities in compensation, authority 
superimposed on an acquired company and the increase in size of an acquiring company 
(Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger & Weber, 1992, Lubatkin, 1983,). Those problems become 
especially severe if firms engage in international acquisitions – where the difficulty of the 
acquisition integration is increased by the foreign and thus unknown aspects of different 
organizational and national cultures. Finally, companies acquiring internationally face 
problems connected to managing the international corporation consisting of many (acquired) 
subsidiaries in different countries.   
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Thus, to make international acquisitions and to become successful with them, 
companies have to develop skills and routines allowing them to overcome the above-
mentioned problems. One of the potential sources of those skills could be the previous 
experience with acquisitions (Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, 
Harrison et al, 1991, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). 
However, learning from previous acquisitions experience is not an easy task, for two reasons. 
Firstly, inexperienced companies are likely to misattribute their previous acquisition 
experience (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). It means that acquiring companies cannot 
distinguish between their previous acquisitions and the focal one. Consequently, they apply the 
same routines that seemed to work before to the situations to which they should not apply 
them. This, in turn leads to the decrease of acquisitions performance.  
Secondly, international acquirers have to determine what the frequency of foreign 
expansion should be. On the one hand, when the business environment is characterized by fast 
changes, shortened product life cycles, and increased competition, faster speed in carrying out 
structural changes, in decision making, and in innovation or product development is generally 
associated with better organizational performance (Eisenhardt, 1989, Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995, Judge & Miller, 1991, Schoonhoven et al., 1990, Stalk & Hout, 1990). Some researchers, 
on the other hand, have pointed out the downsides or “hidden costs” of speed (Crawford, 1992, 
Von Braun, 1990, 1991), such as excessive usage of resources (Crawford, 1992), speed traps 
(Perlow, Okhuysen & Repenning, 2002) and so on.  
Although there is no consensus in the prior literature as to what the effect of speed of 
performing certain activities on organizational performance is, internationalization theory and 
organizational learning theory point clearly to the disadvantages of the fast expansion and 
suggest that companies have an optimal pace of expanding internationally (Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002). It has been argued that organizations learn when they collect second-hand 
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information and/or experiential learning, synthesize it into systematic knowledge, assimilate it 
into organizational memory, and finally institutionalize it into organizational routines (Crossan, 
Lane & White, 1999). This process, however, does not occur instantly and, thus, fast-paced 
expansion can be harmful because it intensifies the time compression diseconomies problem 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Consequently, the imperfect decision-making, suboptimal time and 
attention, and lack of learning will make it difficult for a hastily established subsidiary to 
survive, grow, or profit (Hayward, 2002, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002).  
Finally, prior research has not explored other potential experiences that could be of use 
to international acquirers. It has concentrated mostly on experience with acquisitions and its 
influence on acquisition performances, while disregarding any other sources of potential 
experience that internationalizing companies could draw from.  
In what follows we analyze the sources of useful routines for making international 
acquisitions. Specifically, we concentrate on experiences with prior foreign and domestic 
acquisitions and prior foreign joint ventures. We will build on the idea that since routinization 
of an activity is the most important and efficient form of storage of a firm’s specific 
operational knowledge (Levitt & March, 1988, Nelson & Winter, 1982), while over time firms 
develop routines that consequently help them to economize on cognitive efforts and allow 
faster learning and, thus, help to increase the frequency of acquiring abroad (Cyert & March, 
1963, Levinthal & March, 1993, Levitt & March, 1988, March, 1991, Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
 
2.4. Theory and hypotheses 
 
International acquisition experience might help internationalizing companies to develop 
routines on how to screen, select, and take over companies abroad, to determine what suitable 
levels of acquisition integration are, as well as to become more skilled in solving 
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administrative problems (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Experienced international acquirers 
know when to acquire and when not to, realize when outside financial, legal or other resources 
are needed, and identify the key success factors for successful integration (Hitt et al, 1998). 
Thanks to experience with foreign acquisitions, companies get to know how much time it 
might take until the acquired company is fully integrated and operational, whether it is better to 
transfer some of the staff from the headquarters to the newly acquired subsidiary, and if so, 
who is essential at which stage of the acquisition integration process, etc. Finally, by drawing 
from their prior international acquisitions companies can learn how to perform all those 
activities in an international setting and operate as a multinational corporation (with 
subsidiaries scattered all over the world). Thus, prior international acquisitions provide a 
valuable source of experience based on which internationalizing acquirers can develop routines 
that help them to increase the efficiency of the acquisition process and increase the frequency 
with which they acquire abroad.  
However, international acquisitions are complex events, with many dimensions in 
which they differ from each other (Zollo & Singh, 2002). This results in a situation when 
international acquirers learn from their previous experience to build routines for taking over 
companies abroad efficiently, but they still do not have the ability to apply that knowledge in 
the appropriate moments (i.e. do not have the ability to distinguish between their different 
acquisitions). Hence, the misattribution of experience and lack of ability to judge when to 
apply a routine and when not to, (initially) decrease the successfulness of international 
acquisitions.  
As internationalizing companies accumulate experience with international acquisitions 
they become able to compare different deals, to draw conclusions and to observe emerging 
patterns. This can broaden the range of organizational experiences and stimulate the 
subsequent process of gaining knowledge, for example by increasing absorptive capacity 
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(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), or by leading to new rules which entail new experiences with them 
(March et al, 2000). Moreover, learning results in developing the ability to apply the correct 
routines to the given problem or to a particular type of a deal. One of the effects of gaining 
experience with international acquisitions, therefore, is the ability of companies to learn and to 
remember previous experiences better, which builds their capability to acquire abroad, more 
quickly and successfully. In sum, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The number of international acquisitions per year is increasing as a 
function of prior experience with foreign acquisitions.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a U-shaped relationship between experience with foreign 
acquisitions and successfulness of international acquisitions. 
 
The need to select a good acquisition target and its subsequent integration are the major causes 
of complexity when making an acquisition (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger & Weber, 1992, 
Haspelagh & Jemison, 1991, Jemison & Sitkin, 1986, Lubatkin, 1983). Previous domestic 
acquisitions provide an excellent source of routines that companies could use to learn how to 
accomplish international acquisitions (Reuer et al, 2004). Domestic acquisitions, for example, 
allow a firm to learn how to cooperate with a target and how to handle a new separate entity in 
the organization without simultaneously having to deal with the complexity of a foreign 
environment (Barkema et al, 1997). Experience with domestic acquisitions could also help to 
develop routines for selecting acquisitions targets, setting up the financial criteria that potential 
targets should meet, determining how big the target companies should be, etc. Thus, domestic 
acquisitions can be an important stepping-stone for launching international acquisitions and 
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help internationalizing acquirers to relatively quickly develop necessary routines that increase 
the efficiency of their operations. 
However, despite certain similarities, domestic and foreign acquisitions differ from 
each other. International acquisition deals have the unique features such as greater internal 
uncertainty (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988) and differences in cultures as well as legal, tax and 
regulatory environments (e.g. Markides & Ittner, 1994) – characteristics that experience with 
domestic acquisitions does not have (or not to such a degree). At such levels of similarity 
between different organizational actions (as for domestic and foreign acquisitions) judgments 
about whether to apply the previous experience or not are likely to be difficult, at least initially, 
and the likelihood of making an error in applying past experience to the focal activity is high 
(Zollo & Reuer, 2002). It means that it might be difficult for internationalizing companies to 
build a routine for distinguishing appropriately between their domestic and foreign 
acquisitions, which has two implications. First, as international acquirers have developed the 
efficiency routines only, they will increase the speed with which they acquire internationally. 
Second, the performance of the foreign acquired subsidiaries decreases since the second type 
of skills has not been developed and international acquirers misattribute their experiences.  
As firms gain some more experience with domestic acquisitions and get more 
international exposure, they learn to perceive both surface and underlying features of their 
experiences (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981), and distinguish the underlying differences 
between the domestic and foreign deals. Consequently internationalizing acquirers develop a 
set of routines that could be applicable either in the domestic or to a foreign setting. They also 
develop a second type of routines that allows them to routinely distinguish between their 
acquisitions and determine which routines should be applied and when they should be used.  
Thus, the successfulness of foreign acquisitions will first decrease (since firms 
misapply their experiences expand too fast) and only afterwards, when firms are able to 
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generalize from their experiences, domestic acquisitions become useful for international 
acquirers and the performance of the foreign acquisitions increases.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: The number of international acquisitions per year is increasing as a 
function of experience with domestic acquisitions.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a U-shaped relationship between experience with domestic 
acquisitions and successfulness of international acquisitions. 
 
Whenever a firm is acquired in a foreign country, both national and corporate cultures have 
their impact on the venture, since they are (to some extent) transmitted via institutionalized 
organizational practices, such as decision making procedures and corporate policies (Brown, 
Rugman & Verbeke, 1989, Buckley & Casson, 1988, Bueno & Bowditsch, 1989). Thus, a 
major source of difficulties pertaining to international acquisitions is the necessity to cooperate 
with different, foreign acquisition targets and handling different (foreign) cultures within one 
organization. The capability to deal with foreign partners and different cultures within one’s 
own company (without a need to integrate that partner into a company at the same time) can be 
developed by participating in international joint ventures (Anand & Khanna, 2000, Dyer & 
Singh, 1998,). Thus, learning from prior foreign joint venture experience could help companies 
to develop routines that might prove to be useful when buying a company abroad, and to do it 
more quickly and successfully.  
However, the large body of evidence that firms selectively use alliances over 
acquisitions in well-defined contexts (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993, Hennart & Reddy, 1997, 
Kogut & Singh, 1988) indicates that knowledge obtained in managing alliances may not be 
suitable for acquisitions context (Zollo & Reuer, 2002). Zollo and Reuer (2002), for example, 
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suggest that the development of organizational routines specific to the handling of alliance 
processes would be beneficial to the performance of the focal acquisition if the latter were 
managed in ways that resemble the typical handling of alliances (with low to modest structural 
integration and resource replacement levels). However, when acquisitions are managed with 
higher levels of integration and replacement, alliance experience can adversely affect the 
performance of the focal acquisition (Zollo & Reuer, 2002). It means that it might be difficult 
for companies to distinguish appropriately between the routines that worked well in 
international joint ventures setting and those that might be appropriate for foreign acquisitions. 
Thus, despite having the routines that allow them to increase the frequency of acquiring 
abroad, the lack of ability to distinguish between foreign acquisitions and joint ventures makes 
it more likely that they will often misuse their routines, misapply their experiences and 
misjudge the situations when deciding to apply a certain routine. Such a misattribution of 
experience leads to the decrease of the foreign acquisitions’ the performance.  
Accumulation of experience with international joint ventures helps international 
acquirers to learn to perceive both surface and underlying features of their experiences (c.f. 
Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981), and distinguish the underlying differences between those two 
forms of foreign direct expansions. In this way a second set of routines is developed that 
enables routinely distinguishing between acquisitions and joint ventures and determining of 
which routines should be applied and when. This helps to increase the performance of foreign 
acquisitions over time and the benefit from experience with foreign joint ventures. Thus, we 
predict: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The number of international acquisitions per year is increasing as a 
function of experience with international joint ventures. 
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Hypothesis 3b: There is a U-shaped relationship between experience with international 
joint ventures and successfulness of international acquisitions. 
 
2.5. Methodology  
 
2.5.1. Data 
We tested the above hypotheses on a sample of nonfinancial firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange in 1993. The firms on this stock exchange are divided into two segments – 
“main funds” (large firms that are frequently traded) and less traded funds (smaller firms that 
are infrequently traded). The first segment contains about 35 firms, the second 230 firms. We 
selected our firms from the main funds segment. In the process of screening the companies we 
observed that the four largest Dutch companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips and Akzo 
Nobel) form a distinct group in terms of their breadth of activities, scope and size. These firms 
are incorporated in the Netherlands, but an overwhelming proportion of their investments and 
business operations take place outside the Netherlands. These firms also differed significantly 
from the other firms in the population in terms of the breadth of their activities, their size, and 
so on. Royal Dutch, for example, represented almost 50% of the capitalization of the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Hence, we decided to exclude them from our sample. In this way 
we obtained our longitudinal database of 25 firms over 32 years. 
The database contained all foreign expansions (acquisitions, joint ventures and 
greenfields) included in the annual reports of the firms between 1966 and 1998. This window 
was chosen because the FDIs of these firms began to increase around the mid-1960s or later, 
starting from relatively low levels of the degree of their internationalization. The companies in 
our sample were relatively large companies (the average number of employees was 11,394 and 
their average sales amounted to NLG 3,109 billion) that operated in a wide variety of countries 
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and industries (including manufacturing office equipment, precision machinery, paper and 
packaging, food products, brewing, publishing, retailing, trading etc). Altogether in the 32-year 
period, the 25 companies made 1087 foreign acquisitions (228 of them failed). On average 
each company made 1.59 foreign acquisitions abroad per year, with standard deviation of 2.42 
acquisitions per year. The average experience with foreign acquisitions, domestic acquisitions 
and joint ventures coming close to, respectively, 13 (with the standard deviation of 17.30) and 




Number of foreign acquisitions in a particular year. To measure the frequency of 
internationalization by acquisitions we constructed a variable that counts the number of 
acquisitions made abroad by each company in any given year. This measure reflects the 
number of deals that a company is making in a given year and the higher the number of deals 
the higher the frequency of internationalization by means of acquisition. An acquisition was 
defined as a takeover of an existing company or any of its business units (c.f. Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) .  
Longevity of foreign acquisitions. Acquisition success was defined in terms of whether 
an acquisition was divested (“unsuccessful”) or retained (“successful”), as a few successful 
acquisitions are divested and few unsuccessful acquisitions are retained (Bergh, 1997, 
Hamilton & Chow, 1993, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Based on this 
information we constructed our second dependent variable - longevity of foreign acquisitions 
that was defined as the number of years a foreign acquisition persisted.  
The survival/divesture representation of acquisition outcome has often been criticized 
(Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). However, the usually preferred financial measures of an 
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acquired company (e.g. Cannella & Hambrick, 1993, Very et al, 1997) are not available in our 
case, because multinational companies do not usually report the performance of the acquired 
company per se. Consequently, the aggregated performance of the acquiring company does not 
reflect the success of the acquisition as this measure could also include the contributions of 
other business lines and other subsidiaries/expansion modes.  
Moreover, by measuring acquisition outcome in a broader manner than financial 
performance, we have the opportunity to capture nonfinancial criteria, which are also important 
antecedents to acquisition successes (see Bergh, 1995, Duhaime & Grant, 1984, Hamilton & 
Chow, 1993). Survival/retention of an acquisition has been shown to reflect acquisition success 
(Bergh, 2001, Boot, 1992, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992), as there is a lot of evidence that most 
unsuccessful acquisitions are divested and successful ones are retained (Duhaime & Grant, 
1984, Hamilton & Chow, 1993, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Finally, survival and 
divestment of acquired companies are also outcomes valued highly by executives and 
shareholders (Alexander, Benson & Kampmeyer, 1984, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992).  
 
Independent variables 
Experience with international acquisitions. This variable was measured as the cumulative 
number of prior foreign acquisitions since 1966 (the beginning of our window of analysis).  
Experience with domestic acquisitions. This variable was measured as the number of 
prior domestic acquisitions since 1966.   
Experience with international joint ventures was measured as a number of prior foreign 
joint ventures since 1966. Joint ventures were defined as expansions that the focal company set 
up and owned jointly with another company.  
Control variables. A number of control variables were included in the analysis. First, 
we controlled for the experience with foreign greenfields (measured as the number of prior 
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foreign greenfields of the focal firm since 1966), since companies may have used this 
knowledge and the capabilities derived from such experience when making acquisitions 
abroad. An expansion was called a foreign greenfield if a subsidiary was newly formed in a 
given market by the focal company. For the same reasons as in the case of other experience 
variables we lagged this variable by two periods. Second, due to the fact that managers of 
highly profitable firms may use the firms’ free cash flow for acquisitions of other companies to 
increase their power, prestige, and salary, even if acquisitions do not enhance firm value 
(Jensen, 1986), we controlled for the firm’s profitability, using the firm’s return on assets or 
ROA (e.g. Hitt et al, 1997). Next, we controlled for firm size (since in general larger firms 
have more resources for expansion). We controlled for it using the logarithm of the firm’s 
number of employees. We also controlled for product diversity of the firm by including a 
variable that determines the total number of businesses in which a mother company is active 
each year. Furthermore, we wanted to assure that both curves are not a result of 
macroeconomic effects, rather than the hypothesized learning effects. Thus, we used a control 
variable: the growth of the Dutch market (measured as the growth of GNP one year before the 
acquisition was made), since growth of a home market may influence the number of 
acquisitions that companies are willing to make. We also wanted to control for the possibility 
that a change of the acquisition strategy would be a result of a change of the CEO. Thus, we 
included a variable that measures the number of years that a manager has been a CEO (CEO 
tenure) and a dummy variable to indicate whether a CEO of a focal company has changed. 
Finally, to take into account the overall trends in the economy, fashions (when all the firms are 
acquiring rapidly), or the possibility that making acquisitions in 1998 was not as difficult and 
unusual as it was in 1966, we also included 5-year time dummies. Please see Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1. Means, standard deviations and correlations 
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2.5.3. Analysis 
Negative Binomial Regression 
The number of acquisitions in a particular year is a count variable with non-negative integer 
values only, many of which are equal to zero. The linear regression model assumptions of 
homoscedastic, normally distributed error terms, are thus violated. In such situations, Poisson 
regressions are often used to analyze count data (e.g. Blundell, Griffith & Reenen, 1995, 
Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984). A Poisson process assumes, however, that the event of 
interest occurs at some rate over the observation period. Such models are fairly restrictive and 
require the mean and variance to be equal. However, if observations within a year are not 
independent, the variance may be greater than the mean. Negative binomial regression 
generalizes the Poisson model by allowing the rate of underlying processes to vary across 
observations according to a gamma distribution and thus we use this approach to test our 
hypotheses.  
In this paper we used firm fixed effects controls. Firm effects control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity (stemming from different managerial skills, management know-
how or organizational culture and other factors that are not explicitly taken into account by 
the model). In other words, the firm fixed effect takes into account factors that differ across 
firms, but that are relatively stable over time within firms.  
To deal with the potential problem of simultaneity we used a two period lag for 
experience with foreign and domestic acquisitions as well as with foreign joint ventures. 
Since absorptive capacity refers not only to the assimilation of information but also to the 
ability to exploit it, companies need some time to understand the newly acquired experience 
to be able to put it to commercial use (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Hence, a two-year lag 
(i.e., a minimum of one year between the last acquisition experience and the new acquisition) 
seemed justified.  
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An alternative would be to follow Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and use a 
quasi-difference approach to construct moments that are independent of the fixed effects. 
However, this approach was not adopted here since the choice of instruments is often a 
problem with such a GMM approach, as weak instruments may cause trouble when trying to 
solve a simultaneity bias problem (Hahn & Hausman, 2002).  
 
Survival analysis 
The hypotheses concerning the effect of previous experience with foreign and domestic 
acquisitions as well as foreign joint ventures on successfulness of the acquired subsidiary 
abroad were tested using survival analysis, or event history approach.  
Parametric estimates of the hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of time (in 
our models, age) on failure. However, some of our explanatory variables i.e. operating 
experience, increase as the acquisition ages. Therefore, since the dependence of subsidiary 
mortality on age is unknown, we estimated the proportional hazard model following the Cox 
partial likelihood approach, as this semi-parametric model does not require assumptions about 
this effect. We chose the Cox model because of its flexibility. Unlike discrete time models, 
such as the log-normal or Weibull models, Cox model does not require identification of a 
specific, distinct hazard function. For each foreign acquisition, an event is registered upon 
failure. The dependent variable in this type of analysis is the instantaneous rate of subsidiary 
dissolution, which is based on the information regarding whether or not an affiliate is still in 
existence and how long it has persisted.  
The positive parameter estimates for a given variable means that larger values of this 
variable increase the probability of acquisition failure. We allow the explanatory variables to 
be time-varying, which results in multiple observations for each of the analyzed subsidiaries. 
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To account for possible dependence between different observations corresponding to the same 
subsidiary, we allow for clustering, which treats the observations to be independent across 
subsidiaries, but that does not require different observations on the same subsidiary to be 
independent. Finally, we also estimated a robust coefficients covariance matrix. To control for 
the possible firm specific effects that are relatively stable over time and vary across firms and 
may have an influence on the way a given organization manages its subsidiaries we included 




Tables 2.2. and 2.3. provide the statistical results of the hypotheses tests. Models 1 and 3 
present the estimates of negative binomial regression and survival analysis, respectively, with 
control variables only. Models in table 2.3. (the Cox regression) are represented in the hazard 
rate formulation, which in the case of survival analysis, is the reverse of longevity. The results 
of survival analysis with control variables only (model 3) indicate that firm size and product 
diversification of a mother company have a significant relationship to the acquisition outcome 
(at p<0.001 level), while experience with foreign greenfields has a significant positive impact 
on the hazard of acquisition dissolution (p<0.1 level).  
                                                 
1 Firm dummies here are defined at the parent company level (not at the subsidiary level). 
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Table 2.2. Results of Negative binomial regression models 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Test of hypotheses     
Experience with domestic acquisitions e   0.095 * (0.044) 
Experience with foreign JV e   -0.015 (0.021) 
Experience with foreign acquisitions e   0.055 * (0.028) 
Control variables     
Experience with foreign greenfields -.013 (0.012) -0.014 (0.012) 
ROA .156 (0.514) 0.171 (0.503) 
Firm size e .218 † (0.154) 0.194 (0.164) 
CEO tenure .001 (0.008) 0.002 (0.008) 
CEO change dummy .006 (0.137) -0.003 (0.137) 
GNP growth -.578 † (0.382) -0.520  (0.378) 
Product diversity -.001 (0.012) -0.012 (0.012) 
Constant -.002 (1.388) -0.015 (1.458) 
Log-likelihood -823.019  -817.187  
Wald test χ2 162.29  168.05  
P-value χ2 0.0000  0.0000  
No. of observations 630  630  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
standard errors in parentheses 
e variable is a logarithm 
time dummies not shown 
      
Model 2 shows the results for the full negative binomial regression model. Hypothesis 
1a predicts that the number of foreign acquisitions per year will increase as a function of the 
experience with foreign acquisitions. As can be seen, in Model 2 the coefficient for prior 
experience with foreign acquisitions is positive and significant at p<0.05 level. Thus, our 
hypothesis regarding the shape of the relationship between the experience with foreign 
acquisitions and the number of foreign acquisitions per year is statistically supported.  
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Experience with domestic acquisitions was also hypothesized to positively influence 
the number of foreign acquisitions per year (hypothesis 2a). As can be seen, in Model 2 the 
coefficient for prior experience with domestic acquisitions is positive and significant at 
p<0.05 level. Thus, our hypothesis regarding the shape of the relationship between the 
experience with domestic acquisitions and the number of foreign acquisitions per year is 
statistically supported.  
Hypothesis 3a states that a firm’s experience with foreign joint ventures causes an 
increase in the number of their foreign acquisitions per year. As reflected in table 2.2. the 
coefficients of linear effects of experience with foreign joint ventures is however not 
significant, which does not support our hypothesis.  
Results of the survival analysis are presented in model 4.  
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Table 2.3. Results of Cox regression models 
 Model 3  Model 4  
Test of hypotheses     
Experience with foreign acquisitions    0.034 † (0.331) 
Experience with foreign acquisitions^2   -0.0005** (0.184) 
Experience with JV    0.088 (0.028) 
Experience with JV^2   -0.0004 † (0.004) 
Experience with domestic acquisitions   0.054* (0.228) 
Experience with domestic acquisitions^2   -0.0005† (0.166) 
Control variables     
ROA -1.625 (1.384) -3.413 * (1.662) 
Firm size -0.383 *** (0.115) -0.568 *** (0.137) 
CEO tenure -0.005 (0.011) 0.007 (0.012) 
Product diversity 0.042 *** (0.011) 0.024 * (0.011) 
Experience with foreign greenfields 0.151 † (0.089) 0.079 (0.108) 
Log-likelihood -817.866  -800.579  
LR test χ2 77.03  111.61  
P-value χ2 0.0000  0.0000  
No. of observations 7421  7421  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
standard errors in parentheses 
firm and time dummies not shown 
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In hypothesis 1b we expect a curvilinear (U shaped) relationship between a firm’s 
experience with foreign acquisitions and the successfulness of foreign acquisitions. The 
coefficient corresponding to the linear effect of the experience with foreign acquisitions is 
positive and significant (p<0.1) and the coefficient for the squared effect of experience with 
foreign acquisitions is negative and significant (p<0.01). Jointly these results indicate that 
inexperienced acquirers rushing with their acquisition process indeed cause the hazard of 
subsidiary dissolution to be high for low values of experience with foreign acquisitions. The 
hazard of failure first increases until it reaches the maximum for the value of 38 of experience 
with foreign acquisitions. Subsequently, the hazard decreases with higher levels of experience 
in acquiring foreign targets (see Figure 2.1.). This supports hypothesis 1b. 
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Figure 2.1. Relationship between experience with foreign acquisitions 
and the hazard of foreign acquisition failure 
 
Next, hypothesis 2b posed that the relationship between experience with domestic 
acquisitions and the successfulness of an acquired subsidiary abroad is U shaped. The 
coefficient corresponding to the linear effect of the experience with domestic acquisitions is 
positive and significant (p<0.05) and the coefficient for the squared effect of experience with 
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domestic acquisitions is negative and significant (p<0.1). Jointly these results indicate that 
inexperienced acquirers rushing with their acquisition process indeed cause the hazard of 
subsidiary dissolution to be high for low values of experience variable. The hazard of failure 
first increases until it reaches the maximum for the value of 57 of experience with domestic 
acquisitions. Subsequently, the hazard decreases with higher levels of experience in acquiring 
domestic targets (see Figure 2.2.). This supports hypothesis 3b.  
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Figure 2.2. Relationship between experience with domestic acquisitions 
and the hazard of foreign acquisition failure 
 
Finally, in hypothesis 3b we presumed a U shaped relationship between experience 
with foreign joint ventures and the successfulness of the acquired subsidiary abroad. As 
expected, the coefficient for the linear effect of experience with foreign joint ventures is 
positive and insignificant and the coefficient for the squared effect of experience with foreign 
joint ventures is negative and significant (p<0.1). The hazard of foreign acquisition failure is 
increasing until value of 11 of experience with foreign joint ventures. Subsequently, the 
hazard decreases, for higher levels of experience in making foreign joint ventures (see Figure 
2.3.), which supports our hypothesis. 
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Figure 2.3. Relationship between experience with foreign joint ventures 




International acquisitions have become one of the most important foreign entry modes, yet 
many of them still fail, creating dilemmas about how to decrease the risks attached to them. 
To help to improve our understanding of these problems we asked several questions: how can 
firms learn to acquire internationally? what experiences might prove useful for them? how 
frequently can organizations acquire and stay/become successful? Our study was designed to 
answer these questions. In doing so, we focused on the literature on learning from prior 
acquisition experience (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) and on the characteristics of the 
internationalization process (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002) as jointly they provide the 
perspective and background to analyze the problems of this study.  
The study results show that experience with foreign and domestics acquisitions 
positively influences the frequency of acquiring abroad, while the relationship between prior 
(foreign and domestic) acquisition experience and foreign acquisition performance is U 
shaped. We explain these results by arguing that when firms learn, they develop two types of 
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skills: 1) for performing acquisition process tasks more efficiently and 2) for distinguishing 
different investment situations (judging when it is appropriate to apply a given routine). The 
first type of skill is developed relatively faster, which encourages companies to acquire more 
frequently. Yet, due to the fact that international acquirers do not have the second skill 
initially (and hence misattribute their prior experiences), the performance of the foreign 
acquisitions decreases. Over time, as organizations accumulate sufficient experience, develop 
the two sets of routines and learn to distinguish between the experiences and different 
organizational actions, they are able to increase the performance of their acquisitions, as a 
function of their previous experiences, and are able to acquire frequently at the same time.  
Quite intriguing, however, we found no support for the idea that the experience with 
foreign joint ventures helps companies to increase the frequency of acquiring internationally. 
While foreign joint venture experience has the predicted effect on performance of foreign 
acquisitions (U shaped), it does not help acquirers to increase the frequency with which they 
acquire. One potential explanation for these results could be that there might be a substitution 
effect between international joint ventures and international acquisitions as a way to enter 
foreign countries (c.f. Chi, 1994, Hennart & Reddy, 1997, Reuer & Koza, 2000) 
The results of this study extend the findings of Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) who 
suggested that inexperienced acquirers misattribute their previous experiences, which leads to 
the decrease of the acquisition performance; only over time, when firms learn when to 
generalize and when to distinguish their experiences they are able to appropriately use the 
previous acquisitions experience. By drawing from organizational learning literature and 
internationalizing process literature we are able to explain why the misattribution of 
experiences occurs and what kind of consequences it has for the behavior and performance of 
a firm. In this paper we also extend this logic to other types of experience that might be of use 
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for international acquirers (i.e. previous experience with foreign and domestic acquisitions 
and with foreign joint ventures).  
This paper contributes also to the literature on learning from previous acquisitions 
experience that has previously lead to inconsistent results varying from positive (Fowler & 
Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001), to negative 
or non-existent (Burton et al, 1994, Lahaey & Conn, 1990, Zollo & Singh, 2002). We find 
that the relationship between prior experience with foreign and domestic acquisitions and with 
foreign joint ventures first negatively influence the foreign acquisition performance, yet at 
higher levels of experience this relationship becomes positive. In this way, and using a 
different method for measuring the performance of acquisitions, we also find a U shaped 
relationship between experience and performance (c.f. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  
Finally, we add to the stream of literature on the internationalization process that has 
suggested that companies have one optimal pace with which they should expand (Vermeulen 
& Barkema, 2002). We suggest that if companies learn and if they develop appropriate 
routines they will be able to economize on their cognitive efforts, and thus increase the 
frequency of making their expansion abroad. With this we suggest that companies do not have 
one optimal pace of international expansion which is stable over time.  
Naturally, this study is not without limitations. First, our study explored firms head-quartered 
in a single country (the Netherlands), which raises the issue of generalizability. Although 
doing single country studies also has advantages (in terms of controlling for potentially 
confounding influences), additional empirical research using samples from other countries or 
multiple countries would clearly add to the current study. Absorptive capacity may for 
instance, be influenced by home country characteristics, national culture, and so on. Future 
research may provide more insights in this respect.  
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Furthermore, we treated the experience with acquisitions (both domestic and foreign) 
as homogenous, while this experience is rather heterogeneous as different types of 
acquisitions (horizontal, related, vertical and unrelated) might provide variations in learning 
rates. 
Finally, the firm’s ability to learn from previous experience may vary with the firm’s 
organizational characteristics. For instance, it may depend on the characteristics of its top 
management team, or its organizational structure. Future research uncovering how these and 
other factors influence the relationship between previous experience and acquisition 
performance would clearly complement the current study as well. 
 
















This study examined the dynamics of the process of expansion by acquisitions by 
internationalizing firms on a sample of 1087 international acquisitions. By taking into account 
behavioral and cognitive aspects that have an impact on managerial decision to undertake an 
acquisition we provided insights into the way in which organizations learn and into the 
process of expansion by acquiring abroad. The results suggested that the pace of making 
foreign acquisitions is first increasing, then decreasing and subsequently increasing again as a 
function of experience with international acquisitions and as a function of experience with 
international greenfields. We also find a U shaped relationship between experience with 





Buying a company abroad and its subsequent integration are complex and difficult tasks and, 
thus, many international acquisitions turn out to be unsuccessful (Datta, Pinches & 
Narayanan, 1992, Jensen, 1988, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Very often they 
end in financial losses and divestures, damage of the reputation of the acquiring firm and its 
managers and dismissal of executives (Bergh, 2001, Donaldson, 1990, Kaplan & Weisbach, 
1992). At the same time, the number of foreign acquisitions has been steadily increasing over 
the past decade. Their value rose from less than $100 billion in 1987 to $1144 billion in 2000 
and after a slow down at the beginning of the 21st century, we observe another rise in 
acquisition activity (UNCTAD, 2005). If acquisitions are becoming popular again, even 
though history shows us that so many fail, then why do companies continue to undertake 
these risky actions? What is the dynamics of the process of expansion by acquisitions by 
internationalizing firms? 
Prior studies have begun to address these questions by focusing mainly on motivations 
for a single acquisition and have lead to inconsistent findings. On the one hand, studies 
anchored in the rational choice perspective have pointed to economic explanations of 
acquisitions motives such as financial synergies used to lower the acquirer’s costs of capital 
(Chatterjee, 1986, Singh & Montgomery, 1987), governance efficiencies (Dundas & 
Richardson, 1980, Hill & Hoskisson, 1987), and managerial desire for prestige, power, salary 
and job security that comes with managing large companies (Amihud & Lev, 1981, Baumol, 
1967, Marris, 1964, Williamson, 1963). This research has portrayed an executive as a rational 
decision maker, who is surveying an efficient market place for strategically advantageous 
acquisition opportunities. On the other hand, another stream of literature has suggested that 
due to recent organizational success, media praise for CEO, a CEO’s perceived self-
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importance and weak board vigilance (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) managers may not be 
rational in their choices with respect to acquisition targets and, thus, often make mistakes in 
assessing what they deem to be good acquisition candidates (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, 
Roll, 1986).  
However, both streams of previous research on acquisitions motives do not recognize 
that acquisitions may occur multiple times in an organization’s history and have neglected the 
impact of organizational learning and experience on a decision to buy a company and on the 
process of international expansion by acquisitions. The literature that did acknowledge the 
impact of acquisition experience on performance has pointed to the problems associated with 
the correct understanding of prior experience with acquisitions (i.e. its misattribution) 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al, 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 
2001). Very little is known, however, about consequences of managerial biases and 
limitations for the way in which organizations learn and for the frequency and the 
successfulness of acquiring firms abroad.  
To address these limitations, in this paper we focus on international acquisitions made 
over the life of the company. We propose that the kind and amount of experience that 
organizations have might influence their eagerness to acquire abroad. First, we develop an 
argument about how various managerial biases at different levels of the company’s 
acquisition experience influence the behavior of managers reflected in the number of foreign 
acquisitions per year that they are willing to make. We argue that due to overconfidence, self-
serving bias (Langer, 1983), misattribution (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) and illusion of 
control (Bradley, 1978, Schelnker, 1980) the organizational learning process is constrained. 
More specifically, we hypothesized that due to these four reasons at low levels of experience 
firms make their acquisitions at a very high frequency (make a lot of acquisitions per year). 
This, however, negatively influences the successfulness of their foreign acquisitions. The 
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deficient performance experiences (after a period dominated by unjustified euphoria) make 
companies realize their mistakes, carefully consider and examine all the past experiences, and 
learn from them. We claim that only then firms are able to speed up their international growth 
through acquisitions, this time, however, more successfully. Second, we show that 
international greenfields could also be a source of valuable experience for international 
acquirers and we apply the mechanism of how they learn to acquire abroad to learning from 
previous experience with foreign greenfields as well.  
 
3.3. Theory and hypotheses 
 
Organizations are shaped by complex learning processes that enable them to build an 
organization-wide understanding and interpretation of their environments (Argyris & Schon, 
1978, Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) as well as to develop mental associations, cognitive 
systems and memories that are shared by members of an organization (Hedberg, 1981). A key 
role in molding organizational learning is played by the strategic-level managers (Daft & 
Weick, 1984) who observe and interpret the environment and take decisions by transforming 
their understandings of the reality into policies that govern organization’s activities. In this 
way managers have a considerable influence on the strategic direction of a firm and the nature 
of corporate strategy (including making acquisitions) (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, 
the managerial abilities to consider all the information from their environments are limited 
(Simon, 1957) and subject to several biases stemming from managerial fantasies and their 
neurotic styles (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984) that cause various organizational inefficiencies.  
Tversky & Kahneman (1974), for example, suggest that when making forecasts about 
a successful strategy, decision-makers are often not sensitive to the amount of experience they 
hold. This makes them overly confident about their predictions about the direction and actions 
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that companies should take in the future. Such predictions (and hence strategies) are 
oftentimes based on a small amount of observations, as decision makers feel that this small 
sample of experience that they have is already representative and could form a basis for 
building a future strategy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In other words, it suggests that 
inexperienced companies may base their expectations and strategies on a small number of 
foreign acquisitions, while implicitly and confidently assuming (and acting as if) they have 
already accumulated sufficient amount of knowledge about acquiring abroad. 
Furthermore, since managers are often promoted on the basis of performance (which 
implies that being successful at each subsequent stage of the corporate ladder is a necessary 
condition for reaching the higher position within a company) they might fall into the trap of 
illusion of control - i.e. excessive confidence in their ability to produce positive outcomes 
(Langer, 1983). This creates a partly unjustified self-confidence among executives and might 
lead them to overestimate the extent to which they can control the risks that their 
organizations face (March & Shapira, 1987). This in turn could make companies believe that 
whatever they do, including acquiring abroad, will lead to success. 
Finally, managers are subject to a self-serving bias (Bradley, 1978, Taylor & Brown, 
1988). Because of it executives tend to attribute success to personal factors and failure to 
external, situational (environmental) causes (Wagner & Gooding, 1997). Such a tendency 
occurs because people are motivated to protect their self-esteem, maintain a sense of mastery 
over their environment, or project favorable self-images to others (Bradley, 1978, Schlenker, 
1980). As a result managers are inclined to believe that their foreign acquisitions succeed 
thanks to their superior management skills, but fail due to various external and unforeseeable 
circumstances. Such a perception is contributing to an overall feeling of success and at the 
same time making it difficult for managers to accept the negative feedback that they receive. 
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Finally, as the feeling of success reduces the need for information seeking (Miller & Chen, 
1999), companies do not put effort into acquiring more information about how to choose and 
integrate foreign partners and how to acquire abroad. 
Thus, in sum, inexperienced managers start the international expansion by acquisitions 
confidently and consequently limit the set of lessons from their prior acquisitions by being 
open to information about success only and blocking the information on failure of their 
acquisitions. All together it makes them convinced that they are able to manage an even more 
rapid international expansion through acquisitions i.e. they can successfully make more 
acquisitions within any given period of time.  
However, buying many foreign companies per year may cause a lot of troubles 
(Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Since managers get more and more confident and do not pay 
attention to the problems they probably learn only a little about how to make foreign 
acquisitions, yet not enough to really understand all the complexities and challenges of this 
process. Additionally the increasing pace of entering foreign countries by acquiring a 
company in that market – due to increasing overconfidence - makes it more likely that 
managers will devote sub optimal time and attention to carefully screen, select and implement 
their acquisitions (Birkinshaw, 1997). Hence, when initiating more and more new foreign 
acquisitions within a given period of time, it is less likely that the firm will realize the full 
profit potential of these new expansions (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). All together the 
higher number of subsidiaries established in a short period of time will threaten the chances of 
their success. As a consequence more foreign acquisitions will get into trouble and their 
performance will decrease.  
Many difficulties and failures, however, challenge current practices and procedures by 
drawing attention to previously overlooked problems and inconsistencies (Sitkin, 1996) and 
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by producing overwhelming evidence that cannot be ignored. Thus, it becomes increasingly 
difficult for managers to attribute the bad outcomes to the unpredictable external 
circumstances. This, in turn, results in a feeling of a need for corrective action (Cameron, 
1984, Cyert & March, 1963, Sitkin, 1996). It suggests that many problems with acquisitions 
could motivate the companies to slow down the pace of acquiring abroad to analyze their 
experiences so far and to draw the lessons that can be learned from it. Since the evidence 
becomes so undeniable firms might start to consider (and accept all the available feedback 
and not only the one suggesting the good performance of their acquisitions). Thus, thanks to 
receiving (and accepting) more balanced information on their acquisitions (i.e. both about 
their successes and failures), companies can form a more realistic picture of their actual 
performance and draw new, more accurate conclusions about their abilities and skills to 
acquire abroad (for example about what they are best at and what their strengths are as well as 
what they still have to learn). Having more acquisitions to compare, acquirers are also able to 
interpret the new information more accurately, classify it more appropriately and make better 
use of it. This gives them more accurate routines and better skills, which leads to a better 
performance, and thus, longer survival of their acquisitions. As a result of having accurate 
routines firms can save on their cognitive efforts, perform some tasks routinely (like for 
example choosing the right targets, screening the potential targets, integrating the targets etc) 
and, thus, firms can speed up their international expansion by acquisitions again, this time 
however much more successfully.  
In sum, we expect the number of acquisitions carried out by a firm to first increase, as 
its managers gain false confidence about their ability to make acquisitions. Next, we expect 
the pace of new acquisitions to drop, as firms realize that there is something wrong. This 
allows companies to reconsider and analyze what has gone badly as well as what has been the 
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strength. As a result of such an analysis firms learn and are able to pursue more acquisitions 
per year in a more conscious manner and more successfully.  
Putting all the above arguments together we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The pace of making foreign acquisitions is first increasing, then 
decreasing and subsequently increasing again as a function of experience with foreign 
acquisitions.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a U shaped relationship between experience with foreign 
acquisitions and successfulness of foreign acquisitions. 
 
Both acquisitions and greenfields are modes of foreign direct investment that require a 
physical presence in a foreign location. Experience with any of them could help firms to learn 
how to manage their subsidiaries abroad and how to integrate every new subsidiary into a 
network of their existing subsidiaries (Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000), to gather information 
about dealing with new national cultures, host governments (law, local rules and customs), 
marketing techniques appropriate in a given country, functioning of the distribution channels, 
and tastes of local customers (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998, Hennart & Park, 1993, Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977). It suggests that some knowledge and routines that a firm develops when 
undertaking international greenfields could be used in making international acquisitions. 
Foreign greenfields, thus, could be a useful source of routines that could help companies to 
increase the efficiency of their process of entering foreign countries through acquisitions.  
However, since managers are not good statisticians (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
they base their judgments about similarity of greenfields and acquisitions on a small amount 
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of observations and thus, cannot notice all the differences between them. Further, due to self-
serving bias (Langer, 1983) and illusion of control (Bradley, 1978, Schlenkler, 1980), they 
become overconfident and, thus, prone to believe that they have mastered the skill of 
internationalizing and setting up companies abroad by learning from their experiences with 
greenfields. It implies that when making international acquisitions while having some 
experience with greenfields, firms are inclined to focus on those aspects of their repertoire 
that appeared to be most successful in the situation when they were making a greenfield 
investment (c.f. Miller, Lant, Milliken & Korn, 1996). Consequently, companies may 
replicate the “tricks” and routines that seemed to work when establishing a greenfield 
investment and use them when making an acquisition. In sum, the confidence of being skilled 
in operating abroad gained from their prior greenfield expansions and misattribution of the 
experience with setting up greenfields abroad to the acquisition expansions encourages 
internationalizing firms to make acquisitions more frequently.  
Despite certain similarities between the two expansion modes, greenfields differ 
substantially from acquisitions, however. Foreign greenfields involve building an entirely new 
organization in a foreign country. They are usually managed and staffed with at least a 
number of key people who have worked within the organization for some time and thus know 
its culture, routines and habits (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998, Hennart & Park, 1993, 
Hofstede, 1980). In other words, in case of greenfields companies are not exposed to the 
problems of post-acquisition integration, which is, however, the case when they acquire a 
company. Consequently, greenfield investments spare companies the troubles of overcoming 
routines and habits of the acquired company, changing its mindsets and teaching it the new 
way of operating etc. (c.f. Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). In contrast, in case of an acquisition, the 
expanding firm buys (part of) the equity of an existing firm in a foreign country. In this way, 
the acquiring firm is also taking over (part of) the local personnel that knows how to operate 
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in a local economy and possesses information valuable to the company, yet at the same time 
carries with it the target’s idiosyncratic set of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Integration 
of target companies with the bidding company often leads to clashes and tensions, owing to 
the confrontation of different cultures, structures and systems (Chatterjee et al., 1992, Datta & 
Grant, 1990, Jones & Hill, 1988). Thus, a main difference between greenfields and 
acquisitions is that a firm making a greenfield investment is able to mold the affiliate by 
choosing its location and hiring its labor force, while a firm making an acquisition inherits the 
acquired firm’s labor force and company culture (Hennart & Park, 1993). Thus, dealing with 
international acquisitions in the same way as with international greenfields is a recipe for 
trouble. By applying some or all routines developed in making a greenfield investment to 
making an acquisition, for example, the acquirer may try either to change the acquired 
companies in ways that do not fit their contingencies and administrative heritages or to 
consolidate them too extensively (Datta & Grant, 1990, Pablo, 1994). Consequently, the 
inappropriate management of acquisitions could lead, at least initially, to an increased number 
of failed investments.  
Prolonged bad performance, however, is likely to help companies to realize their 
mistakes (Sitkin, 1996). Finding themselves in troubles, firms can be expected to decrease the 
number of undertaken acquisitions (as argued above). The slower pace allows them to analyze 
their experiences with both greenfields and acquisitions, understand how to make them better 
and how to distinguish between them. As firms gain acquisition experience and develop an 
expertise in determining underlying dissimilarities between acquisitions and greenfields (i.e. 
the organization develops from novice to expert), the tendency to generalize inappropriately 
would be likely to diminish, while the tendency to generalize appropriately should increase, 
leading to greater success (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Thus, experienced companies are 
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able to speed up their pace of acquisitions again and be more successful with them at the same 
time.  
Thus we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The pace of making foreign acquisitions is first increasing, then 
decreasing and subsequently increasing again as a function of experience with foreign 
greenfields.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a U shaped relationship between experience with foreign 





We tested the above hypotheses on a sample of non-financial firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange in 1993. The firms on this stock exchange are divided into two segments – 
“main funds” (large firms that are frequently traded) and less traded funds (smaller firms that 
are infrequently traded). The first segment contains about 35 firms, the second 230 firms. We 
selected our firms from the main funds segment. In the process of screening the companies we 
observed that the four largest Dutch companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips and 
Akzo Nobel) form a distinct group in terms of their breadth of activities, scope and size. 
These firms are incorporated in the Netherlands, but an overwhelming proportion of their 
investments and business operations took place outside the Netherlands. These firms also 
differed significantly from the other firms in the population in terms of the breadth of their 
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activities, their size, and so on. For example, Royal Dutch represented almost 50% of the 
capitalization of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Hence, we decided to exclude them from 
our sample. In this way we obtained our longitudinal database of 25 firms over 32 years. 
The database contained all foreign expansions (acquisitions, joint ventures and 
greenfields) included in the annual reports of the firms between 1966 and 1998. This window 
was chosen because the FDIs of these firms began to increase around the mid-1960s or later, 
starting from relatively low levels of international posture. The companies in our sample were 
relatively large companies (the average number of employees was 11,394 and their average 
sales amounted to NLG 3,109 billion) that operated in a wide variety of countries and 
industries (including manufacturing office equipment, precision machinery, paper and 
packaging, food products, brewing, publishing, retailing, trading etc). Altogether in the 32-
year period, the 25 companies made 1087 foreign acquisitions (228 of them failed) and 284 
greenfield investments abroad. On average each company made 1.59 foreign acquisitions per 
year, with a standard deviation of 2.42 acquisitions per year and 0.36 international greenfields 
per year (with standard deviation of 0.78). This resulted in the average experience with 
international acquisitions and greenfields coming close to, respectively, 14 (with the standard 
deviation of 17.81) and 6 (with standard deviation of 7.15) over the study period.  
 
3.4.2. Variables 
Dependent Variables  
Number of acquisitions in a particular year. To measure the speed of internationalization by 
acquisitions we constructed a variable that counts the number of acquisitions made by each 
company in any given year. This measure reflects the number of deals that a company is 
making in a given year and the higher the number of deals the higher the speed of 
internationalization by means of acquisition. An acquisition was defined as a takeover of an 
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existing company or any of its business units (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998, Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001). 
Longevity of foreign acquisitions. Acquisition success was defined in terms of whether 
an acquisition was divested (“unsuccessful”) or retained (“successful”), as a few successful 
acquisitions are divested and few unsuccessful acquisitions are retained (Bergh, 1997, 
Hamilton & Chow, 1993, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Based on this 
information we constructed our second dependent variable - longevity of foreign acquisitions 
that was defined as the number of years a foreign acquisition persisted.  
The survival/divesture representation of acquisition outcome has often been criticized 
(Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). However, the usually preferred financial measures of an 
acquired company (e.g. Cannella & Hambrick, 1993, Very et al, 1997) are not available in our 
case, because multinational companies do not usually report the performance of the acquired 
company per se. Consequently, the aggregated performance of the acquiring company does 
not reflect the success of the acquisition as this measure could also include the contributions 
of other business lines and other subsidiaries/expansion modes.  
Moreover, by measuring acquisition outcome in a broader manner than financial 
performance, we have the opportunity to capture non-financial criteria, which are also 
important antecedents to acquisition successes (see Bergh, 1995, Duhaime & Grant, 1984, 
Hamilton & Chow, 1993). Survival/retention of an acquisition has been shown to reflect 
acquisition success (Bergh, 2001, Boot, 1992, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992), as there is a lot of 
evidence that most unsuccessful acquisitions are divested and successful ones are retained 
(Duhaime & Grant, 1984, Hamilton & Chow, 1993, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Lastly, 
survival and divestment of acquired companies are also outcomes valued highly by executives 
and shareholders (Alexander, Benson & Kampmeyer, 1984, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992).  
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Independent variables  
Experience with international acquisitions. This variable was measured as the number of prior 
foreign acquisitions since 1966 (the beginning of our window of analysis). Since first, second 
and third power of this variable appears in our models, we decided to apply an orthogonal 
transformation of those linear quadratic and cubic terms. It is a technique, which yields 
canonical functions that are independent of each other. In other words, the canonical functions 
are derived in such a way that when plotted in a multivariate space, they are orthogonal to 
each other, which ensures their statistical independence. Therefore, we avoid the potential 
multicolinearity problems. We also estimated models with those variables being mean 
centered and results (not shown) were virtually identical.  
Experience with international greenfields. An expansion was called a greenfield if a 
subsidiary was newly formed by the focal company. We measured this variable as the number 
of prior foreign greenfields of the focal firm since 1966. Similarly as in the case of experience 
with acquisitions we used an orthogonal transformation to create the second and third order 
polynomials of this variable. The results for the mean centered variable (not shown here) were 
similar.  
Control variables. A number of control variables were included in the analysis. First, 
we controlled for the experience with foreign joint ventures (measured as the number of prior 
foreign joint ventures of the focal firm since 1966), since companies may have used this 
knowledge and the capabilities derived from such experience when doing acquisitions. Joint 
ventures were defined as expansions that the focal company set up and owned jointly with 
another company. For the same reasons as in the case of experience with foreign acquisitions 
and greenfields, we used a variable lagged by two periods. Second, due to the fact that 
managers of highly profitable firms may use the firms’ free cash flow for acquisitions of other 
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companies to increase their power, prestige, and salary, even if acquisitions do not enhance 
firm value (Jensen, 1986), we controlled for the firm’s profitability, using the firm’s return on 
assets or ROA (e.g. Hitt et al, 1997) at the beginning of each year. We also controlled for firm 
size, since in general larger firms have more resources for expansion. We controlled for it 
using the logarithm of the firm’s number of employees at the beginning of each observation 
year. We also controlled for product diversity of the firm by including a variable that 
determines the total number of businesses a mother company is active in each year. 
Furthermore we wanted to assure that both curves are not a result of macroeconomic effects, 
rather than the hypothesized learning effects. Thus, we used a control variable: the growth of 
the Dutch market (measured as the growth of GNP one year before the acquisition was made), 
since growth of a home market may influence the number of acquisitions that companies are 
willing to make. Finally, to take into account the overall trends in the economy, fashions 
(when all the firms are acquiring rapidly), or the possibility that making acquisitions in 1998 
was not as difficult and unusual as it was in 1966 we also included 5-year time dummies.  
Please see Table 3.1 for summary statistics. 
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Table 3.1. Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 







































































































































































































































































































































The speed and success of international acquisitions: the learning perspective 
 53 
3.4.3. Analysis 
Negative Binomial Regression 
The Number of acquisitions in a particular year is a count variable with non-negative integer 
values only, many of which are equal to zero. The linear regression model assumptions of 
homoscedastic, normally distributed error terms, are thus violated. In such situations Poisson 
regressions are often used to analyze count data (e.g. Blundell, Griffith & Reenen, 1995, 
Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984). A Poisson process, however, assumes that the event of 
interest occurs at some rate over the observation period. Such models are fairly restrictive and 
require the mean and variance to be equal. However, if observations within a year are not 
independent, the variance may be greater than the mean. Negative binomial regression 
generalizes the Poisson model by allowing the rate of underlying processes to vary across 
observations according to a gamma distribution and thus we use this approach to test our 
hypotheses.  
In this paper we used firm fixed effects controls. Firm effects control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity (stemming from different managerial skills, management know-
how or organizational culture and other factors that are not explicitly taken into account by 
the model). In other words, the firm fixed effect takes into account factors that differ across 
firms, but that are relatively stable over time within firms. Following Cameron and Trivedi 
(1998), we estimated our models using a conditional likelihood approach.  
To deal with the potential problem of simultaneity to test hypotheses 1a and 2a, we 
used a two period lag for experience with acquisitions. Since absorptive capacity refers not 
only to the assimilation of information but also to the ability to exploit it, companies need 
some time to understand the newly acquired experience to be able to put it to commercial use 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Hence, a two-year lag (i.e., a minimum of one year between the 
last acquisition experience and the new acquisition) seemed justified.  
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An alternative would be to follow Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and use a 
quasi-difference approach to construct moments that are independent of the fixed effects. 
However, this approach was not adopted here since the choice of instruments is often a 
problem with such a GMM approach, as weak instruments may cause trouble when trying to 
solve a simultaneity bias problem (Hahn & Hausman, 2002).  
 
Survival analysis 
The hypotheses concerning the effect of previous experience with foreign acquisitions and 
greenfields on the successfulness of the acquired subsidiary abroad were tested using survival 
analysis, or event history approach (hypotheses 1b and 2b).  
Parametric estimates of the hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of time (in 
our models, age) on failure. However, some of our explanatory variables i.e. operating 
experience, increase as the acquisition ages. Therefore, since the dependence of subsidiary 
mortality on age is unknown, we estimated proportional hazard model following Cox partial 
likelihood approach, as this semi-parametric model does not require assumptions about this 
effect. We choose the Cox model because of its flexibility. Unlike discrete time models, such 
as the log-normal or Weibull models, Cox model does not require identification of a specific, 
distinct hazard function. For each foreign acquisition, an event is registered upon failure. The 
dependent variable in this type of analysis is the instantaneous rate of subsidiary dissolution, 
which is based on the information on whether or not an affiliate is still in existence and how 
long it has persisted.  
The positive parameter estimates for a given variable means that larger values of this 
variable increase the probability of acquisition failure. We allow the explanatory variables to 
be time-varying, which results in multiple observations for each of the analyzed subsidiaries. 
We account for possible dependence between different observations corresponding to the 
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same subsidiary. We allow for clustering, which assumes the observations to be independent 
across subsidiaries, but that does not require different observations on the same subsidiary to 
be independent. Finally, we also estimated a robust coefficients covariance matrix. To control 
for the possible firm specific effects that are relatively stable over time and vary across firms 
and may have an influence on the way a given organization manages its subsidiaries we 




Tables 3.2. and 3.3 provide the statistical results of the hypotheses tests. . Models in table 2.3. 
(the Cox regression) are represented in the hazard rate formulation, which in the case of 
survival analysis, is the reverse of longevity. Models 1 and 3 present the estimates of negative 
binomial regression and survival analysis, respectively, with control variables only. In model 
1 experience with joint ventures is related to the number of acquisitions per year at the 
p<0.001 level, GNP growth at p<0.01 level and finally firm size and product diversification of 
mother company are significantly related to the dependent variable at p<0.05 level. The 
results of survival analysis with control variables only (model 3) indicate that ROA and 
product diversification of a mother company have a significant relationship to the acquisition 






                                                 
2 Firm dummies here are defined at the parent company level (not at the subsidiary level). 
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Table 3.2. Results of negative binomial regression models 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Test of hypotheses     
Experience with acquisitions e   0.328** (0.114) 
Experience with acquisitions ^2 e   -0.181** (0.069) 
Experience with acquisitions^3 e   0.058† (0.041) 
Experience with greenfields e   0.295* (0.133) 
Experience with greenfields^2 e   -0.196*** (0.059) 
Experience with greenfields^3 e   0.098* (0.047) 
Control variables     
Experience with jv 0.062*** 0.0183 -0.008 (0.025) 
ROA 0.528 0.486 0.106 (0.513) 
Firm size 0.339* 0.144 0.052 (0.145) 
Product diversity -0.020* 0.009 -0.009 (0.010) 
GNP growth -1.232** 0.427 -0.794* (0.414) 
Constant     
Log-likelihood -884.768  -870.675  
Wald test χ2 133.22  165.12  
P-value χ2 0.0000  0.000  
No. of observations 649  649  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
standard errors in parentheses 
e variable is a polynom 
time dummies not shown 
 
Model 2 shows the results for the full negative binomial regression model. Hypothesis 
1a predicts that the number of foreign acquisitions per year as a function of the experience 
with foreign acquisitions would first increase, then decrease and finally increase again. Since 
we used the orthogonal polynom of the experience with acquisition we can directly verify the 
significance of each coefficient in our models. As can be seen, in Model 2 all the coefficients 
for prior experience with acquisitions are significant (first and second power at p<0.01 level 
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and third power at p<0.1 level). However, the magnitude of the effects in the negative 
binomial regression models cannot be interpreted directly, since it is a multiplicative rather 
than an additive model. Jointly the results indicate that the speed of acquisitions is increasing 
until it reaches the maximum for experience with 67 acquisitions. Next, the number of 
acquisitions is decreasing, until it reaches the minimum value for the 107 acquisitions of 
experience. Afterwards the pace is increasing again. The plotted results for this hypothesis are 
presented in Figure 3.1. Thus, our hypothesis regarding the shape of the relationships between 
the experience with acquisitions and the number of acquisitions per year is also statistically 
supported.. 
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between experience with foreign acquisitions and 
number of foreign acquisitions per year.  
 
Hypothesis 2a states that firm’s experience with foreign greenfields causes it to 
increase the number of their foreign acquisitions per year at first. Subsequently, this number 
decreases and finally increases again for high levels of experience with greenfields abroad. As 
reflected in table 3.2. the coefficients of linear and cube effects of experience with startups are 
positive and significant (both at 0.05 level), while the coefficient of the squared effects of 
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experience with greenfields is negative and significant (at level 0.01). These results indicate 
that the number of acquisitions abroad as a function of previous experience with international 
greenfield investments first increases until it reaches the maximum is reached at the 
experience with 15 greenfields. Next the number of acquisitions per year drops until the 
minimum for experience with 38 greenfields and finally it starts increasing again (see Figure 
3.3.). This is in line with the predicted shape of the curve and thus supports our hypothesis 2a.  
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Figure 3.3. Relationship between experience with foreign acquisitions and 
hazard of foreign acquisition failure.  
 
 
Results of the survival analysis are presented in model 4. 







Table 3.3. Results of Cox regressions models 
 Model 3  Model 4  
Test of hypotheses     
Experience with acquisitions e   -0.806** (0.293) 
Experience with acquisitions ^2 e   -0.746*** (0.176) 
Experience with greenfields e   0.665* (0.286) 
Experience with greenfields^2 e   -0.224† (0.158) 
Control Variables     
Experience with jv -0.013 (0.023) -0.042 (0.039) 
ROA -1.66† (1.078) -3.160* (1.397) 
Firm size -0.141 (0.1721) -0.425† (0.286) 
Product diversity 0.016† (0.009) 0.054*** (0.013) 
GNP growth 0.013 (0.694) 0.091 (0.710) 
Log-likelihood -1168.762  -1141.549  
Wald test χ2 74.01  157.96  
P-value χ2 0.0000  0.0000  
No. of observations 7717  7717  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
standard errors in parentheses 
e variable is a polynom 





In hypothesis 1b we expect a curvilinear (U shaped) relationship between a firm’s experience 
with foreign acquisitions and the successfulness of foreign acquisitions. In the case of an 
event history model, the size of the effect implied by the coefficients cannot be interpreted 
directly, since it also is a multiplicative rather than an additive model (just like models 3). The 
coefficient corresponding to the linear effect of the experience with international acquisitions 
is negative and significant (p<0.01) and the coefficient for the squared effect of experience 
with foreign acquisitions is negative and significant (p<0.0001). Jointly these results indicate 
that inexperienced acquirers rushing with their acquisition process abroad indeed cause the 
hazard of subsidiary dissolution to be high for low values of experience variable. The hazard 
of failure first increases until it reaches the maximum for the value of 36 of experience with 
acquisitions. Subsequently, the hazard decreases with higher levels of experience in acquiring 
foreign targets. This supports hypothesis 1b. See Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. Relationship between experience with foreign greenfields and 
number of foreign acquisitions per year. 
 
Finally, in hypothesis 2b we presumed a U shaped relationship between experience 
with foreign greenfields and the successfulness of the acquired subsidiary abroad. As 
The speed and success of international acquisitions: the learning perspective 
 61 
expected, the coefficient for the linear effect of experience with foreign greenfields is positive 
and significant (p<0.05) and the coefficient for the squared effect of experience with start-ups 
is negative and significant (p<0.1). See Figure 
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Figure 3.4. Relationship between experience with foreign greenfields and 




Prior research has shown that many corporate acquisitions fail (Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 
1992, Jensen, 1988, Markides & Oyon, 1998, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987) 
since acquiring firms encounter numerous challenges (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, 1983, Haspelagh 
& Jemison, 1991, Jemison & Sitkin, 1986, Lubatkin, Schweiger & Weber, 1992). Those 
problems become especially severe if firms engage in the international acquisitions - where 
the foreign, and thus unknown, aspects of different organizational and national cultures 
increase the difficulty of the post acquisition integration. Previous research has proposed 
several potential explanations for why (despite this discouraging evidence) managers are so 
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keen on making acquisitions – among others managerialism (Amihud & Lev, 1981, Baumol, 
1967) and hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, Roll, 1986).  
In this paper we argue that due to overconfidence, self-serving bias (Langer, 1983), 
misattribution (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) and illusion of control (Bradley, 1978, 
Schelnker, 1980) the organizational learning process is constrained. More specifically, we 
hypothesized that due to these four reasons at low levels of experience firms make their 
acquisitions at a very high frequency (make a lot of acquisitions per year). This, however, 
negatively influences the successfulness of their foreign acquisitions. The deficient 
performance experiences (after a period dominated by unjustified euphoria) make companies 
realize their mistakes, carefully consider and examine all the past experiences, and learn from 
them. We claim that only then firms are able to speed up their international growth through 
acquisitions, this time, however, more successfully. 
We also developed and tested finer-grained implications of our theory. We looked at 
how the same mechanisms play out when firms attempt to apply their experience gained when 
establishing greenfield investments abroad to making acquisitions abroad. In particular, we 
expected that, at low levels of experience, firms would erroneously draw inferences from their 
experience with international greenfields when engaging in international acquisitions, greatly 
misattributing their experiences due to overconfidence. Thus, we expected the same 
mechanism and relationship between experience with greenfields and speed of acquisition 
making and acquisition survival as in the case of learning form experience with acquisitions. 
Also those implications of our theory were strongly corroborated. 
Our findings add to the discussion on the effect that experience with acquisitions has 
on acquisition performance. Previous research notes that experience with acquisitions appears 
to be the principal mechanism by which firms obtain skills to become successful acquirers 
(Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). 
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At the same time other research claims that experience with acquisitions does not help to 
build organization’s acquisition skills (Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Lahaey & Conn, 1990, 
Zollo & Singh, 2002). Finally, Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) suggest that the relation 
between acquisitions’ experience and performance might be different for different levels of 
experience. Similarly to Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999), in this paper we find a U shaped 
relationship between the prior foreign acquisitions experience and their performance. By 
focusing on both the process of international expansion by acquisitions and managerial biases 
that motivate them to acquire abroad we are able to explain why the performance initially 
decreases and link it directly to the behavior of the acquiring firm in terms of how many 
acquisitions it is willing to make per year.  
Our study is marked by a number of limitations. First, we treat experience with 
acquisitions as being homogenous. In other words we do not take into account the fact that 
there are many different kinds of acquisitions – i.e. horizontal, related, unrelated and vertical. 
The question of whether the experience with any of those acquisitions is less likely to make 
companies overconfident and change the degree of misattribution is a fruitful area for future 
research. 
Second, in terms of data, companies in our sample do not form a random sample. They 
are all firms that survived for a sustained period of time (33 years), therefore a certain 
survivor bias is likely to be present. Moreover, the firms in our sample were based in a single 
country, the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a small home market and has been intensively 
engaged in international trade for more than 400 years. Furthermore, organizational learning 
and speed of foreign expansion might be influenced by the culture in which a firm is rooted 
(Hofstede, 1980). Further studies may provide more insight into whether the results from this 
study also apply in other national settings.  
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Another limitation of the study is the lack of data on managerial perceptions. Hence, 
we were not able to observe what exactly causes managerial biases and what helps them to 
overcome their hubris at the later stages of the company development.  
Finally, the pace of making acquisitions may vary with certain organizational 
characteristics. For instance it may depend on the characteristics of the top management team 
(e.g. Schoonhoven et al, 1990), or the current structure of the firm (Barkema & Vermeulen, 
1998). Future research uncovering how these and other factors moderate the impact of speed 
of making foreign acquisitions on their success would be a great complement to the current 
study. 
















In an attempt to out why how firms learn to be successful in acquiring in their core industry 
we focused our attention on two types of experiences that companies could benefit from (i.e. 
prior experience with international horizontal and related acquisitions). We argued that 
international horizontal acquisitions confront the international acquirers with one dimension 
of complexity that they need to deal with – i.e. the new foreign markets and cultures and 
positively influence successfulness and rate of acquiring in the core business. International 
related acquisitions, in turn, involve dealing with at least two levels of complexity – i.e. new 
business and new foreign cultures, which makes it more challenging to learn from. We find, 
however, that firms experienced in acquiring abroad in their core business are able to benefit 





Global restructuring of many industries in response to technological change, 
liberalization and intensification of (international) competitiveness has pushed firms to 
increasingly focus on their core business when acquiring internationally (Anand, Capron & 
Mitchell, 2004). As a result of those trends international mergers and acquisitions between 
competing firms within the same industry have grown rapidly. For example, in 1999 70% of 
the value of cross border mergers and acquisitions were horizontal and the number of this type 
of deals per year has been increasing steadily (UNCTAD, 2000). Related and horizontal 
acquisitions are hypothesized to be more beneficial than unrelated ones because of the greater 
number of strategic fits possible and theory from more than three decades of research can 
generally be distilled into a guiding paradigm that recommends making horizontal and related 
acquisitions over their unrelated alternatives. While unrelated acquisitions may lead to 
synergies in such areas as finance and management, related and horizontal acquisitions can 
have high potential for building on and sharing existing resources and knowledge as well as 
certain economies in marketing and production (Donaldson, 1990, Flanagan, 1996, Flangan & 
O’Shaughnessy, 2003, Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992, Lubatkin, 
1983, Maquieira et al., 1998; Morck et al., 1990, Pangarkar & Lie, 2004; Pennings, Barkema 
& Douma, 1994, Matsusaka, 1993; see also Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992, King, Dalton, 
Daily & Covin, 2004, for reviews). However, even though acquisitions in the core and related 
industries have the highest chances of being successful, making them abroad confronts the 
acquirers with additional challenges (like integration of the foreign targets, dealing with 
foreign cultures and new businesses abroad, transferring knowledge and learning from 
complex and often unknown geographical and business environments) that they might have to 
learn to deal with in order to be successful internationally. The question is how do firms learn 
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to be successful with their horizontal acquisitions and what types of experiences prove to be 
useful for them?  
It is widely accepted that prior experience with acquisitions provides the valuable 
source of lessons that companies could draw from to develop routines for making acquisitions 
successfully and efficiently (Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, 
Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Lahaey & Conn, 1990, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001, Zollo 
& Singh, 2002). One of the problems that companies face when learning from the previous 
acquisition experience, however, is the high danger of misattributing it (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). Thus, previous research has concentrated its efforts on finding out what 
kind of experiences could be both valuable and with the lowest chances of being 
misattributed; those efforts has lead to inconsistent results. On the one hand it has been found 
that the closer the focal acquisition to the previous one, the better the performance of that 
acquisition will be (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). This implies that firms learn best from 
their horizontal acquisitions, since the probability of misattribution of that experience is the 
lowest (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). On the other hand, however, other research has found 
that acquisitions in businesses that are too similar (or too dissimilar) to each other prevent 
acquirers from establishing what is different, special and important about the focal 
opportunity (Hayward, 2002), suggesting that medium levels of similarity between 
acquisitions are the best for companies to learn. From this perspective experience with 
horizontal acquisitions could have a limited, or even negative effect on the acquisition 
performance while experience with related acquisitions could be the most optimal type of 
experience to learn from.  
The abovementioned studies have been mostly concerned with identification of 
experience that might prove useful for internationalizing acquirers at any stage of the 
company’s development. In this paper we build on an argument that firms can only learn one 
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thing at a time (Goodman, Wood & Hendrickx, 2004) and argue that as organizations evolve 
and learn they have different skills, capabilities but also needs for what they should still learn. 
Thus, the requirements for what international acquirers have to learn and what kind of 
experiences are most likely to provide the most valuable lessons change at different stages of 
company’s a development or stage of internationalization.  
In this paper, we analyze the effects of experience with foreign horizontal and related 
acquisitions at different levels of experience with horizontal acquisitions on the frequency and 
performance of horizontal acquisitions. In this way, by looking at which experience is applied 
to a particular type of international acquisitions, we are able to understand the way in which 
organizations learn. We argued that international horizontal acquisitions confront the 
international acquirers with one dimension of complexity that they need to deal with – i.e. the 
new foreign markets and cultures. International related acquisitions, in turn, involve dealing 
with at least two levels of complexity – i.e. new business and new foreign cultures, which 
makes it more challenging to learn from. We find, however, that firms experienced in 
acquiring abroad in their core business are able to benefit from their experience with related 




Previous research notes that experience with acquisitions appears to be the principal 
mechanism by which firms obtain skills to become successful acquirers (Fowler & Schmidt, 
1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). For example foreign 
acquisition experience helps firms to develop routines for screening and selecting acquisition 
targets abroad – like for example obtaining more pertinent information about them, setting up 
the financial criteria that they should meet and determining how big the target companies 
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should be  (Reuer, Shenkar & Ragozzino, 2004). Moreover, as internationalizing companies 
gain experience with acquiring abroad they become more adept at implementing the necessary 
structural changes, avoiding and solving the administrative problems, determining the suitable 
levels of post acquisition integration as well as identifying the key success factors for a 
successful and effective integration of a foreign target (Hitt et al., 1998, Lubatkin, 1983, 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Finally, thanks to their prior experience international acquirers 
operating in diverse settings can develop skills and processes to transfer their knowledge and 
resources internationally across their units (from home headquarters to foreign subsidiaries, 
from foreign units to home locations, and across subsidiaries) (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000, 
Hedlund, 1994). This requires the development of skills for decontextualizing and 
recontextualizing the knowledge that internationalizing acquirers want to transfer and 
integrate into the acquired firm’s units. In other words, thanks to accumulating experience 
companies acquiring abroad become more skilled at making the firm’s resources less context 
specific and more suitable to redeployment on an international scale (Brannen, Liker & Fruin, 
1998, Doz & Santos, 1997). All those routines and skills, as Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) 
argue, help the company to increase the survival rate of their foreign subsidiaries.  
Since prior acquisition experience is a complex source of acquisition routines (Zollo & 
Reuer, 2002), previous research has been busy identifying the characteristics of the prior 
experience that could ensure the most successful learning process and acquisition routines 
development. On the one hand, for example, a close resemblance of the companies’ 
acquisitions to each other is crucial in order to overcome the danger of failing to judge when it 
is appropriate to generalize from the previous experience to the focal acquisition and when it 
is better not to apply that experience (i.e. distinguish between previous acquisitions and the 
focal one) (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Consequently, due to the different effect of 
generalization behavior (i.e. positive for similar acquisitions but negative for dissimilar 
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acquisitions), acquisitions that are similar to the previous acquisitions should outperform 
acquisitions that are dissimilar to previous acquisitions (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). This 
might suggest that the more similar the acquisitions are to each other, the better the acquirer 
learns. However, at the same time other research suggested that acquisitions of businesses that 
are too similar or dissimilar to each other prevent acquirers from establishing exactly what is 
different, special and important about a focal acquisition (Hayward, 2002). For example when 
prior acquisitions are highly similar to one another, they form a homogenous experience 
where acquirers are likely to be proficient at exploiting their current set of competencies but 
lack the generalist skills to appreciate a range of acquiring opportunities, and thus often fell 
into the trap of inertia (Levitt & March, 1988) or myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993). In turn, 
when prior acquisitions are highly dissimilar acquirers lack the specialist skills to extract 
gains from any type of acquisition (Hayward, 2002) – i.e. they have developed the ability to 
explore their environment but not to actually exploit the newly gained knowledge and use it. 
From this perspective, medium levels of similarity are the most useful for companies to learn 
from and provide sufficient variety that prevents acquirers from becoming inert and at the 
same time helps exploiting and improving the efficiency.  
In what follows we argue that in order for us to understand the relationship between 
prior acquisition experience and performance it is important to simultaneously analyze what 
kind of experiences firms learn from and what they apply it to. We take a closer look at 
experience with international horizontal and related acquisitions to determine how different 
experiences influence the performance and expansion rate of horizontal acquisitions.  
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4.4. Theory and hypotheses 
 
Horizontal international acquisitions allow firms to learn the international aspects of buying 
companies abroad. Making foreign horizontal acquisitions abroad increases the complexity of 
operations in just one clearly defined dimension (i.e. new foreign market) that is relatively 
easy to observe for internationalizing companies. Changing one aspect of complexity at a time 
while holding other ones constant provides unconfounded information about the impact of 
this new, changed dimension, which facilitates the accumulation of information about the 
impact of specific actions (Goodman, Wood & Hendrickx, 2004). This helps 
internationalizing acquirers to attach meaning to actions and link specific actions/causes to 
outcomes, which consequently helps them to learn how to acquire abroad.  
For example, when internationalizing acquirers gain experience, it is easier for them to 
spot and evaluate the potential foreign acquisition targets, establish what the performance and 
success requirements are in that industry and market, and tap better into the needs of the 
customers and suppliers abroad (Barkema et al,1996, Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Experience 
in acquiring in the core business helps companies increase their market power, and benefit 
from efficiency gains, reap opportunities for achieving cost savings through exploitation of 
scale and scope economies and increase a firm’s market coverage through the geographic 
extension of the market (Lubatkin, 1983, Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Moreover, having the 
experience with acquiring in different countries equips the firm with a greater capability to 
scan the environment, screen new technologies and ideas, gain access to local resources and 
leverage institutional contacts (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Finally, when international 
companies gain experience in acquiring in the core business abroad, they learn to integrate the 
foreign targets effectively, as they do not have to spend time to learn and understand the new 
business. Thanks to those characteristics of experience with horizontal acquisitions, 
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companies are able to develop a set of standardized and specialized routines for making them 
(Szulanski, 1999). Moreover, since foreign horizontal acquisitions are relatively similar to 
each other, there is little room for misattribution of experiences in case of transferring them 
from one horizontal acquisition to the other. Business familiarity, consequently, allows the 
acquiring firm’s managers to effectively employ their “dominant logic” (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986), which means that with each foreign horizontal acquisition the firm can essentially 
replicate some aspects of its prior expansions. 
In other words, prior experience with horizontal acquisitions not only allows for 
creating useful and efficient routines but it is also desirable that this experience is generalized. 
Generalization in this case allows for automatization of the focal tasks, which helps 
companies to apply the correct routines to correct situations and in this way perform their 
tasks more efficiently – i.e. companies can successfully increase the frequency of 
international expansion by acquisitions. Greater experience with foreign horizontal 
acquisitions and specific routines developed based on that experience provides opportunities 
to refine and improve the routines for making horizontal acquisitions abroad. All together 
those characteristics of foreign horizontal acquisitions make them more likely to be successful 
and learning and transfer of the previous experiences from them more feasible.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Experience with foreign horizontal acquisitions positively influences 
the number of horizontal acquisitions per year. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Experience with foreign horizontal acquisitions positively influences 
the successfulness of horizontal acquisitions.  
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Foreign related acquisitions concern firms that sell similar (but not the same) products and 
serve similar (but not the same) product markets (Blackburn, Lang & Johnson, 1990, 
Chatterjee, 1986). They potentially offer a number of benefits for international horizontal 
acquisitions, like the possibility of sharing intangible resources (such as reputation, 
advertising and promotion know-how), skills and outputs of R&D, experience in establishing 
and running business in a similar industry (for example familiarity with characteristics of 
customer or suppliers bases, prevailing trade practices, technical and regulatory aspects, 
competitive pressure, etc). Thus, in many ways the characteristics of related acquisitions 
might prove to be useful for horizontal acquisitions and offer a possibility to learn from them. 
Since related international acquisitions seem to be similar to horizontal acquisitions, 
companies may be inclined to immediately apply the routines developed when doing related 
acquisitions abroad to their subsequent horizontal acquisitions. Such routines, in turn, 
motivate them to speed up the process of entering foreign countries in their core business.  
However, related foreign acquisitions confront international acquirers with at least two 
different kinds of problems and complexities at the same time (i.e. new geographical market 
and new industry). The correct use of prior experience requires the ability to distinguish 
between investment situations that are similar to earlier experienced ones along certain 
dimensions, and situations that are novel along at least one of those dimensions (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). When more than one dimension is changed simultaneously, it is difficult 
for companies to determine which actions led to an effect or whether the positive and negative 
effects of different actions canceled each other out (c.f. Goodman, Wood & Hendrickx, 2004). 
In other words, complex experiences (such as with foreign related acquisitions) tend to 
produce biased interpretations of what has happened before and why (March & Olsen, 1988). 
In effect, such confounded information will not be useful for modifying or developing 
hypotheses about the relationships between actions and outcomes (Goodman, Wood & 
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Hendrickx, 2004). Thus, at least initially, the risk of misattribution of experience with 
international related acquisitions when making horizontal acquisitions is high for 
inexperienced international acquirers. This, at least initially, causes the successfulness of 
horizontal acquisitions to decrease (c.f. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  
However, firms that have done a number of related acquisitions abroad will learn to 
compare them with the horizontal acquisitions, and will eventually notice the differences and 
appropriately use the knowledge from related acquisitions to their horizontal acquisitions. For 
example, they will learn to distinguish between outcomes of their actions that should be 
attributed to the fact that they are operating abroad or in a different industry. Firms will also 
learn to decontextualize their knowledge from related industries abroad and apply it to new 
international settings in their core industry. By borrowing some solutions from related 
industries international acquirers can get more successful and more innovative, since 
incoming information will relate to what firm already knows (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and 
that new applicable combinations of knowledge will be made (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992, 
Markides & Williamson, 1996). It implies that even though foreign related acquisitions 
initially confuse international acquirers and decrease performance of horizontal acquisitions, 
over time firms learn to benefit from their related acquisitions when making horizontal 
acquisitions, and gradually increase the performance of their horizontal acquisitions over 
time.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Experience with foreign related acquisitions positively influences the 
number of horizontal acquisitions per year. 
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Hypothesis 2b: There is a U shaped relationship between experience with foreign 
related acquisitions and the successfulness of foreign horizontal acquisitions 
 
International related acquisitions are complex and initially difficult to understand for 
internationalizing acquirers (since it is hard to distinguish between what should be attributed 
to the new foreign market and what to a new industry). As it was argued above, experience 
with foreign related acquisitions is pushing firms to initially unjustifiably increase the 
frequency of acquiring in their core business abroad (consequently leading to the decreased 
successfulness of horizontal acquisitions). Yet, as we have argued, over time firms are able to 
gradually learn to benefit from international related acquisitions how to make international 
horizontal acquisitions.  
The magnitude of these effects might be, however, different for companies with 
substantial experience with acquiring in their core business abroad as previous horizontal 
acquisition experience is likely to equip firms with the kind of knowledge that they need to be 
able to correctly apply or disregard their experiences with international related acquisitions 
(cf. Haleblian & Finkelstien, 1999, Teece, 1982). When firms have experience with acquiring 
abroad in their core business, for example, they know how to deal with the foreign targets, 
how to integrate them, and how to benefit from the knowledge gained (as we have argued in 
the hypothesis 1). In this way internationalizing acquirers with a substantial experience in 
acquiring in the core business, who learn from their related acquisitions abroad, narrow the 
dimensions of complexity that they need to comprehend to just one source (new business). 
This awareness can help to avoid misinterpretation and misapplication of their past 
experiences with related acquisitions abroad (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  
Thus, thanks to having experience with horizontal acquisitions abroad international 
acquirers are better able to build routines based on their experience with related acquisitions 
Chapter 4 
 76 
and apply them to their acquisitions in a core business. This, consequently, allows them to 
increase the frequency of expanding in the core business internationally. However, the 
experience with horizontal acquisitions moderates the effect that related acquisitions have on 
the frequency. Having prior experience in the core business companies are able to asses their 
capabilities and strengths better, as they will not make the mistake of misattribution of their 
prior experience with related acquisitions to such a degree as it was the case when the 
experience with horizontal acquisitions was lower. Thus, companies do not rush in at the too 
high speed initially (as it was the case when they did not have the experience with horizontal 
acquisitions). 
Since the companies still have to learn how to use the knowledge from their new, yet 
related, industry the performance of the international horizontal acquisitions will be 
decreasing at the beginning. Yet, since companies do not rush so much and can benefit from 
their experience with related acquisitions abroad more easily, we expect that the drop of the 
performance for the companies who are experienced with acquiring abroad in their core 
business will be much shorter and much smaller. In other words, experience with foreign 
horizontal acquisitions helps international acquirers to benefit from their foreign related 
acquisitions quicker and facilitates the transfer of knowledge from one industry to another.  
 
Hypothesis 3 a: The higher the level of experience with foreign horizontal acquisitions 
the influence of the experience with foreign related acquisitions on the number of 
horizontal acquisitions per year will be positive yet more balanced.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the experience with foreign horizontal acquisitions the 
more positive the impact of experience with foreign related acquisitions on the 
successfulness of horizontal acquisitions. 
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4.5 Methodology  
 
4.5.1. Data 
We tested the above hypotheses on a sample of non-financial firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange in 1993. The firms on this stock exchange are divided into two segments – 
“main funds” (large firms that are frequently traded) and less traded funds (smaller firms that 
are infrequently traded). The first segment contains about 35 firms, the second 230 firms. We 
selected our firms from the main funds segment. In the process of screening the companies we 
observed that four largest Dutch companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips and Akzo 
Nobel) form a distinct group in terms of their breadth of activities, scope and size. These 
firms are incorporated in the Netherlands, but an overwhelming proportion of their 
investments and business operations took place outside the Netherlands. These firms also 
differed significantly from the other firms in the population in terms of the breadth of their 
activities, their size, and so on. For example, Royal Dutch represented almost 50% of the 
capitalization of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Hence, we decided to exclude them from 
our sample. In this way we obtained our longitudinal database of 25 firms over 32 years. 
The database contained all foreign expansions (acquisitions, joint ventures and 
greenfields) included in the annual reports of the firms between 1966 and 1998. This window 
was chosen because the FDIs of these firms began to increase around the mid-1960s or later, 
starting from relatively low levels of internationalization. The companies in our sample were 
relatively large companies (the average number of employees was 11,394 and their average 
sales amounted to NLG 3,109 billion) that operated in a wide variety of countries and 
industries (including manufacturing office equipment, precision machinery, paper and 
packaging, food products, brewing, publishing, retailing, trading etc). All together in the 32-
year period, the 25 companies made 698 foreign horizontal acquisitions (114 of them failed). 
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On average each company made 0.89 horizontal acquisitions per year, with a standard 
deviation of 1.69 acquisitions per year. This resulted in the average experience with horizontal 
acquisitions and related acquisitions coming close to, respectively, 8 (with the standard 




Number of foreign horizontal acquisitions in a particular year. To measure the frequency of 
internationalization by horizontal acquisitions we constructed a variable that counts the 
number of horizontal acquisitions made by each company in any given year. This measure 
reflects the number of deals that a company is making in a given year and the higher the 
number of deals the higher the frequency of internationalization by means of acquisition. A 
horizontal acquisition was defined as a takeover of an existing company or any of its business 
units within the core industry of the acquirer. We defined industries as unique 3-digit SBI 
codes (the Dutch equivalent of SIC codes).  
Longevity of foreign horizontal acquisitions. Acquisition success was defined in terms 
of whether an acquisition was divested (“unsuccessful”) or retained (“successful”), as a few 
successful acquisitions are divested and few unsuccessful ones retained (Bergh, 1997, 
Hamilton & Chow, 1993, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Based on this 
information we constructed our second dependent variable - longevity of foreign horizontal 
acquisitions that was defined as the number of years a foreign acquisition persisted.  
The survival/divesture representation of acquisition outcome has often been criticized 
(Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). However, the usually preferred financial measures of an 
acquired company (e.g. Cannella & Hambrick, 1993, Very et al, 1997) are not available in our 
case, because multinational companies do not usually report the performance of the acquired 
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company per se. Consequently, the aggregated performance of the acquiring company does 
not reflect the success of the acquisition as this measure could also include the contributions 
of other business lines and other subsidiaries/expansion modes.  
Moreover, by measuring acquisition outcome in a broader manner than financial 
performance, we have the opportunity to capture non-financial criteria, which are also 
important antecedents to acquisition successes (see Bergh, 1995, Duhaim & Grant, 1984, 
Hamilton & Chow, 1993). Survival/retention of an acquisition has been shown to reflect 
acquisition success (Boot, 1992, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992, Bergh, 2001), as there is a lot of 
evidence that most unsuccessful acquisitions are divested and successful ones are retained 
(Duhaime & Grant, 1984, Hamilton & Chow, 1993, Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Survival 
and divestment of acquired companies are also outcomes valued highly by executives and 
shareholders (Alexander, Benson & Kampmeyer, 1984, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992).  
 
Independent variables 
Experience with international horizontal acquisitions. This variable was measured as the 
number of prior foreign horizontal acquisitions of the company since 1966 (the beginning of 
our window of analysis).  
Experience with international related acquisitions. This variable was measured as the 
number of prior international related acquisitions since 1966. An international related 
acquisition was defined as a takeover of an existing company or any of its business units in 
the industry abroad related to the core activities of the acquirer (within the same 2 digit SBI-
code category, but not in the same three-digit category) (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). This 
operationalization is in line with the “basic areas” notion of Penrose (1995, p.109), and the 
“dominant logic” concept of Prahalad and Bettis (1986).  
Control variables. A number of control variables were included in the analysis. First, 
due to the fact that managers of highly profitable firms may use the firms’ free cash flow for 
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acquisitions of other companies to increase their power, prestige, and salary, even if 
acquisitions do not enhance firm value (Jensen, 1986), we controlled for the firm’s 
profitability, using the firm’s return on assets or ROA (e.g. Hitt et al, 1997). Second, we 
controlled for firm size (since in general larger firms have more resources for expansion). We 
controlled for it using the logarithm of the firm’s number of employees. We also controlled 
for product diversity of the firm by including a variable that determines the total number of 
businesses a mother company is active in each year. Furthermore we wanted to assure that 
both curves are not a result of macroeconomic effects, rather than the hypothesized learning 
effects. Thus, we used a control variable: the growth of the Dutch market (measured as the 
growth of GNP one year before the acquisition was made), since growth of a home market 
may influence the number of acquisitions that companies are willing to make. We also wanted 
to control for the possibility that a change of the acquisition strategy would be a result of a 
change of the CEO. Thus, we included a variable that measures the number of years that a 
manager has been a CEO. Moreover, we controlled for the experience with foreign joint 
ventures and experience with prior foreign greenfields (measured as the number of prior 
foreign joint ventures of the focal firm since 1966 and number of foreign greenfields of a 
focal firm since 1966, respectively), since companies may have used this knowledge and the 
capabilities derived from such experiences when doing acquisitions. Joint ventures were 
defined as expansions that the focal company set up and owned jointly with another company, 
while we called an expansion a greenfield if a subsidiary was newly formed by the focal 
company (without partners). For the same reasons as in case of experience with acquisitions 
and startups we used a two period lagged variable. Finally, to take into account the overall 
trends in the economy, fashions (when all the firms are acquiring rapidly), or the possibility 
that making acquisitions in 1998 was not as difficult and unusual as it was in 1966 we also 
included 5-year time dummies. Please see Table 4.1 for summary statistics. 
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Negative Binomial Regression 
The Number of acquisitions in a particular year is a count variable with nonnegative integer 
values only, many of which are equal to zero. The linear regression model assumptions of 
homoscedastic, normally distributed error terms are thus violated. In such situations Poisson 
regressions are often used to analyze count data (e.g. Blundell, Griffith & Reenen, 1995, 
Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984). A Poisson process, however, assumes that the event of 
interest occurs at some rate over the observation period. Such models are fairly restrictive and 
require the mean and variance to be equal. However, if observations within a year are not 
independent, the variance may be greater than the mean (see Table 4.1). Negative binomial 
regression generalizes the Poisson model by allowing the rate of underlying processes to vary 
across observations according to a gamma distribution and thus we use this approach to test 
our hypotheses.  
In this paper we used firm fixed effects controls. Firm effects control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity (stemming from different managerial skills, management know-
how or organizational culture and other factors that are not explicitly taken into account by 
the model). In other words, the firm fixed effect takes into account factors that differ across 
firms, but that are relatively stable over time within firms. Following Cameron and Trivedi 
(1998), we estimated our models using a conditional likelihood approach.  
To deal with the potential problem of simultaneity to test hypotheses 1a and 2a, we 
used a two period lag for experience with acquisitions. Since absorptive capacity refers not 
only to the assimilation of information but also to the ability to exploit it, companies need 
some time to understand the newly acquired experience to be able to put it to commercial use 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Hence, a two-year lag (i.e., a minimum of one year between the 
last acquisition experience and the new acquisition) seemed justified.  
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An alternative would be to follow Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and use a quasi-
difference approach to construct moments that are independent of the fixed effects. However, 
this approach was not adopted here since the choice of instruments is often a problem with 
such a GMM approach, as weak instruments may cause trouble when trying to solve a 
simultaneity bias problem (Hahn & Hausman, 2002).  
 
Survival analysis 
The hypotheses concerning the effect of previous experience with foreign horizontal and 
related acquisitions on the successfulness of international horizontal acquisitions (hypotheses 
1b, 2b and 3b) were tested using survival analysis, or event history approach.  
Parametric estimates of the hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of time (in 
our models, age) on failure. However, some of our explanatory variables i.e. operating 
experience, increase as the acquisition ages. Therefore, since the dependence of subsidiary 
mortality on age is unknown, we estimated proportional hazard model following Cox partial 
likelihood approach, as this semi-parametric model does not require assumptions about this 
effect. We choose the Cox model because of its flexibility. Unlike discrete time models, such 
as the log-normal or Weibull models, Cox model does not require identification of a specific, 
distinct hazard function. For each foreign acquisition, an event is registered upon failure. The 
dependent variable in this type of analysis is the instantaneous rate of subsidiary dissolution, 
which is based on the information on whether or not an affiliate is still in existence and how 
long it has persisted.  
The positive parameter estimate for a given variable means that larger values of this 
variable increase the probability of acquisition failure. We allow the explanatory variables to 
be time-varying, which results in multiple observations for each of the analyzed subsidiaries. 
We account for possible dependence between different observations corresponding to the 
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same subsidiary. We allow for clustering to allow the observations to be independent across 
subsidiaries, which does not require different observations on the same subsidiary to be 
independent. Finally, we also estimated a robust coefficients covariance matrix. To control for 
the possible firm specific effects that are relatively stable over time and vary across firms and 
may have an influence on the way a given organization manages its subsidiaries we included 




Tables 4.2. and 4.3. provide the statistical results of the hypotheses tests. Models in table 4.3. 
(the Cox regression) are represented in the hazard rate formulation, which in the case of 
survival analysis, is the reverse of longevity. Models 1 and 3 present the estimates of negative 
binomial regression and survival analysis, respectively, with control variables only.  
 
                                                 
3 Firm dummies here are defined at the parent company level (not at the subsidiary level). 
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Table 4.2. Negative binomial regression models 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Test of hypotheses     
Experience with horizontal acquisitions   0.019** (0.008)      
Experience with related acquisitions   0.095**  (0.035)      
Horiz*Rel   -0.002*  (0.001)     
Control variables     
ROA 1.028 † (0.559) 0.709 (0.582)      
Firm size e -0.039 (0.188) -0.091    (0.189)     
CEO change 0.099 (0.177) 0.129    (0.172)     
CEO tenure -0.011 (0.010) -0.013    (0.010)     
Experience with greenfields 0.0127 (0.015) -0.003    (0.016)     
Log likelihood -678.78  -672.292                  
Wald test χ2 105.99  121.67  
P-value χ2 0.0000  0.0000  
No. of observations 682  682  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
standard errors in parentheses 
e variable is a logarithm 
time dummies not shown 
 
Model 2 shows the results for the full negative binomial regression model. Hypothesis 
1a predicts that the number of foreign horizontal acquisitions per year will increase as a 
function of the experience with them. As can be seen, in Model 2 the coefficient for prior 
experience with international horizontal acquisitions is positive and significant at p<0.01 
level. Thus, our hypothesis regarding the shape of the relationship between the experience 
with international horizontal acquisitions and the number of horizontal acquisitions per year is 
statistically supported.  
Experience with international related acquisitions was also hypothesized to positively 
influence the number of foreign acquisitions per year (hypothesis 2a). As can be seen, in 
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Model 2 the coefficient for prior experience with foreign related acquisitions is positive and 
significant at p<0.01 level. Thus, our hypothesis regarding the shape of the relationship 
between the experience with international related acquisitions and the number of foreign 
horizontal acquisitions per year is statistically supported.  
Hypothesis 3a poses that the higher the level of experience with foreign horizontal 
acquisitions the experience with foreign related acquisitions increases the frequency with 
which acquire abroad in their core business, yet this influence is stabilized and more balanced. 
Thus we expected the signs of the interaction term between the experiences with foreign 
horizontal and related acquisition to be opposite to the main term –i.e. negative. Consistent 
with our theory, the estimate of the interactive term between experience with foreign 
horizontal acquisitions and experience with foreign related acquisitions is significantly 
negative (p<0.05). The plotted results for this hypothesis are presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Relationship between experience with foreign related  acquisitions 
and the number of foreign horizontal  acquisitions per year for different levels of 
experience with  foreign horizontal acquisitions 
 
Results of the survival analysis are presented in model 4.  
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Table 4.3. Cox regression models 
 Model 3  Model 4  
Test of hypotheses     
Experience with horizontal acquisitions   -0.015 † (0.009) 
Experience with related acquisitions   0.095*   (0.045)     
Experience with related acquisitions ^2   -0.003 † (0.002) 
Horiz*Rel   -0.0009†   (0.0006)    
Control variables     
ROA -2.928 (1.427) -1.604    (1.611) 
Firm size -0.490 (0.164) -0.155    (0.189)   
CEO change 0.807 (0.268) 0.828**   (0.266) 
GDP growth 3.099 (0.754) 3.509***   (0.745)    
Experience with greenfields 0.702 (0.219) 0.767** (0.242) 
Experience with JV -0.193 (0.196) -0.415† (0.245)     
Log Likelihood -633.335  -595.449              
Wald test χ2 78.05  124.20  
P-value χ2 0.0000  0.0000  
No. of observations 5957  5957  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
standard errors in parentheses 
firm dummies not shown 
 
In hypothesis 1b we expect a linear relationship between a firm’s experience with 
foreign horizontal acquisitions and the probability of foreign horizontal acquisition success. 
The coefficient corresponding to the linear effect of the experience with horizontal 
acquisitions is negative and significant (p<0.1). This supports hypothesis 1b.  
Next, hypothesis 2b posed that the relationship between experience with foreign 
related acquisitions and the probability of success of an acquired subsidiary in a horizontal 
business abroad is U shaped. The coefficient corresponding to the linear effect of the 
experience with foreign related acquisitions is positive and significant (p<0.05) and the 
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coefficient for the squared effect of experience with foreign related acquisitions is negative 
and significant (p<0.1). Jointly these results indicate that inexperienced acquirers rushing with 
their acquisition process indeed cause the hazard of subsidiary dissolution to be high for low 
values of experience variable. The hazard of failure first increases until it reaches the 
maximum for the value of 38 of experience with foreign related acquisitions. Subsequently, 
the hazard decreases with higher levels of experience in acquiring domestic targets. This 
supports hypothesis 3b.  
Finally, in hypothesis 3c we presumed that for the higher levels of experience with 
international acquisitions the U shaped relationship between experience with prior related 
acquisitions abroad and the successfulness of the foreign horizontal acquisitions will be 
weaker – i.e. the successfulness will be decreasing shorter, the higher the experience with 
horizontal acquisitions abroad, yet the overall shape of the relationship will be persistent of all 
the levels experience with horizontal acquisitions. Thus, we expected that the signs of the 
interaction between experience with international horizontal and related acquisitions would be 
negative. Consistent with this prediction, the interaction effect (variables were mean-centered) 
is negative and significant (p<0.1). The plotted results for this hypothesis are presented in 
Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Relationship between experience with foreign related acquisitions 
and the hazard of foreign horizontal acquisition failure for different levels of 




International acquisitions in the companies’ core industry are part of the every-day business of 
firms striving to survive in the globalizing and increasingly competitive world. Because of the 
substantial number of possible strategic fits in finance and management, high potential for 
building on and sharing existing resources and knowledge as well as economies in marketing 
and production previous research has acknowledged that horizontal and related acquisitions 
have higher chance of being successful as compared to the unrelated acquisitions (Donaldson, 
1990, Flanagan¸ 1996, Flangan & O’Shaughnessy, 2003, Lubatkin, 1983, Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999, Maquieira et al., 1998; Morck et al., 1990; Pangarkar & Lie, 2004). 
However, acquiring abroad confronts the acquirers with additional challenges including  
integration of the foreign targets, dealing with foreign cultures and new businesses abroad 
(Barkema et al, 1996, Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Thus, in this paper we asked the question of 
how could firms learn to be successful with their horizontal acquisitions and what types of 
experiences prove to be useful for them.  
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In this paper, we analyze the effects of experience with foreign horizontal and related 
acquisitions on the frequency and performance of horizontal acquisitions. First of all, we find 
that prior experience with  international horizontal acquisitions allows internationalizing 
acquirers to increase both the frequency and successfulness of acquiring in their core business 
abroad. We explain this finding by arguing that prior experience with horizontal acquisitions 
abroad confronts the international acquirer with the challenges that could be attributed to the 
fact that the acquisition has taken place abroad. In this way, we argue, internationalizing 
acquirers are able to learn what it means to acquire abroad, integrate their foreign targets, and 
connect the actions to outcomes  - i.e. learn from their foreign operations.  Secondly, we find 
that although prior experience with related acquisitions pushes firms to increase the frequency 
of acquiring in their core business from the start, companies are actually able to really benefit 
from their experience with related acquisitions abroad only as they have accumulated more 
knowledge about how to make them and how to transfer the lessons from the related 
industries to the core one (i.e. the relationship between prior experience with international 
related acquisitions and successfulness of horizontal acquisitions abroad is U shaped). This is 
mainly due to the fact that international related acquisitions confront international acquirers 
with at least two types of complexities – i.e. stemming from the operations in a new country 
and in a new (related) business. Hence, it is more challenging for international acquirers to 
attribute the specific causes to the actions that lead to them.  
Finally, we find that the higher the experience with acquiring in the core business is, 
the easier it is for companies to benefit from their experience form related industries abroad.  
These results suggest that that the requirements for what internationalizing acquirers 
have to learn and what kind of the experiences are likely to provide the valuable lessons 
change and differ for different stages of company’s internationalization. Since firms can only 
learn one thing at a time (Goodman, Wood & Hendrickx, 2004) they are not able to benefit 
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from their more complex experiences easily, or without a strong background at doing 
something “simpler” or less complex. 
With this paper we hope to add to the previous literature on acquisition experience and 
performance. It has suggested that firms learn best from their horizontal acquisitions, 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), or conversely, from their prior experience with related 
acquisitions (Hayward, 2002). By simultaneously focusing at the kind of experience that is 
used to a one kind of acquisition we get more insights at how firms actually learn, when they 
misattribute and why.  
Naturally, this study is not without limitations. First, our study explored firms head-
quartered in a single country (the Netherlands), which raises the issue of generalizability. 
Although doing single country studies also has advantages (in terms of controlling for 
potentially confounding influences), additional empirical research using samples from other 
countries or multiple countries would clearly add to the current study. Future research may 
provide more insights in this respect.  
The firm’s ability to learn from previous experience may vary with the firm’s 
organizational characteristics. For instance, it may depend on the characteristics of its top 
management team, or its organizational structure. Future research uncovering how these and 
other factors influence the relationship between previous experience and acquisition 



















5.1. Major outcomes 
 
In an era of rapid technological progress and major political and economic transformations 
across the globe (Barkema, Baum & Mannix, 2002, Ghoshal, 1987, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 
1997), the ability to acquire internationally becomes an important skill for internationalizing 
companies. Cross border mergers and acquisitions are growing rapidly in importance 
precisely because they provide firms with the fastest way of acquiring tangible and intangible 
assets in different countries (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993, Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998). 
That is why over the past decade we observed that the most growth in international expansion 
has been via cross border mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2005). However, it has been 
suggested that, for example, due to problems with coordinating and reconfiguring resources in 
an internationally dispersed network, transferring best practice across units, retaining key 
personnel and exchanging knowledge across geographically scattered units (Anderson, Havila 
& Salmi, 2001, Cannella & Hambrick, 1993, Sirower, 1997) a lot of international acquisitions 
fail or underperform (Bergh, 2001, Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992, Donaldson, 1990, 
Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992, Jensen, 1988, Markides & Oyon, 1998, Porter, 1987, Ravenscraft 
& Scherer, 1987).  
Much research has been conducted in order to determine the conditions under which 
acquisitions have chances to be successful – among others acquirer and target relatedness 
(Donaldson, 1990, Lubatkin, 1983, Flanagan¸ 1996, Flangan & O’Shaughnessy, 2003, 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999, Hayward, 2002, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992, Matsusaka, 1993, 
Maquieira et al., 1998, Morck et al., 1990), acquiring companies’ motives (Amihud & Lev, 
1981, Baumol, 1967, Chatterjee, 1986, Dundas & Richardson, 1980, Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997, Hill & Hoskisson, 1987, Marris, 1964, Singh & Montgomery, 1987, Roll, 1986, 
Williamson, 1963) and prior acquisition experience (Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Fowler & 
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Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Lahaey & Conn, 1990, Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001, Zollo & Singh, 2002).  
While researchers in International Business have often argued that it is important for 
internationalizing companies to learn (Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996, Delios & Beamish, 
2001, Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, Lu & Beamish, 2004, Pedersen & Petersen, 2004, 
Uhlenbruck, 2004) to increase the likelihood of being successful abroad, this argument has 
received mixed empirical support in the domain of acquisitions. Some studies, for example, 
have argued that experienced acquirers are more successful than companies without 
acquisitions experience (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, Hitt, Harrison, Ireland & Best, 1993). 
However, other studies have questioned whether acquisition experience is beneficial, because 
the value of such experience depends on the similarity of past targets to future targets, on the 
inferences made from prior experiences and how they are reapplied to current experiences. 
Hence, acquisition experience may not always enhance acquisition performance. Consistent 
with this idea, some studies have not found a significant positive relationship between 
acquisition experience and firm performance (Halebian & Finkelstein, 1999, Lubatkin, 1983, 
Zollo & Singh, 2004).  
To address these problems, building on the organizational learning literature (e.g., 
Levitt & March, 1988) this thesis develops arguments regarding the performance of foreign 
acquisitions. In addition to looking at the success rate, we develop a new theory and 
hypotheses about the frequency of international acquisitions (i.e., number of acquisitions per 
year). The attention for the pace of international acquisitions is consistent with the increasing 
importance of this strategic issue in practice (Barkema et al., 2002, Hitt et al., 1998) and with 
recent work examining the pace of expansion of companies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989, 
Hayward, 2002, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). However, previous research has typically 
treated pace as an implicit variable, measuring its implications in terms of performance, and 
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implicitly assumed that the (optimal) acquisition pace is constant over time. This thesis 
develops the argument that if internationalizing companies learn, they replace (time and 
attention devoted to) cognitive effort by routines (Cyert & March, 1963, Levitt & March, 
1988, Nelson & Winter, 1982). Hence, we hypothesize that when internationalizing acquirers 
learn they are able to successfully increase the frequency of acquisitions over time. 
Predictions regarding the frequency of foreign expansion by acquisitions in combination with 
our predictions regarding the performance of those expansions allow us to draw conclusions 
about the hypothesized learning effects and hopefully gain a better understanding of the 
mechanism of organizational learning in case of very complex experiences. 
Prior studies have typically focused on acquisition experience per se as a potential 
source for learning to handle acquisitions, without distinguishing between foreign and 
domestic acquisitions (Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 
2002, Hitt et al., 1998, Lahaey & Conn, 1990, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001, Zollo & Singh, 
2004). In this thesis we develop theory and hypotheses about different types of experience of 
internationalizing companies as sources of knowledge and routines for acquiring abroad: 
international acquisition experience, domestic acquisition experience, international joint 
venture experience, and international greenfield experience.  
In chapter 2 we analyzed what experiences could be useful for international acquirers 
and how companies learn to use them. Based on the analysis of experience with prior foreign 
and domestic acquisitions as well as with foreign joint ventures we argued that in order to 
become a successful acquirer companies have to develop two types of routines (c.f. Levitt & 
March, 1988). The first sort (built relatively easily and quickly) allows companies to increase 
the efficiency of the process of international expansion by acquisitions and hence to increase 
the frequency of acquiring in the foreign markets. The second type (that requires more time 
and effort to be developed) routinizes the process of deciding which routines should be 
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applied to which problems and to which settings. We argued that when internationalizing 
companies initially misapply past knowledge and routines from their existing “repertoire” 
(Levitt & March, 1988) and are not able to align the two kinds routines with each other 
(which happens when they are not experienced), the performance of their acquired units was 
decreasing. Yet, over time, through trial and error, when companies develop the second type 
of routines (next to the “efficiency” routines), they are able to increase the successfulness of 
their foreign acquired subsidiaries.  
In chapter 3 we attempted to answer the question of why firms increase the frequency 
of acquiring abroad even though they are not prepared and skilled to do so. We drew attention 
to various managerial biases (including self-serving bias, illusion of control) at different levels 
of the company’s acquisition experience. We suggested, and found consistent with the 
argument, that it was the underestimation of problems related to international acquisitions and 
managerial overconfidence that pushed the companies to increase the number of acquisitions 
per year and consequently increasing the likelihood of costly mistakes being made and 
acquisitions failing. We proposed also that when the accumulated problems and many 
acquisitions divestitures could no longer be ignored, companies slow down to learn and 
analyze their experiences. After the slow down, the number of foreign acquisitions per year 
can increase again to higher levels than before, this time with an increasing success rate. We 
found that mechanism to be valid for learning from prior experience with international 
acquisitions and international greenfields.  
Finally, in chapter 4 we zoomed in on one type of acquisitions - i.e. international 
horizontal acquisitions, to discover how firms learn to be successful with them. To find out 
why it becomes difficult for companies to comprehend their experiences we focused our 
attention on both the experience that is used as well as the kind of acquisitions this experience 
is applied to. We built on an idea that firms can only learn one thing at a time and analyzed 
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what are the effects of experience with foreign horizontal and related acquisitions at different 
levels of experience with horizontal acquisitions on the frequency and performance of 
horizontal acquisitions. We argued that international horizontal acquisitions confront the 
international acquirers with one dimension of complexity that they need to deal with – i.e. the 
new foreign markets and cultures. International related acquisitions, in turn, involve dealing 
with at least two levels of complexity – i.e. new business and new foreign cultures, which 
makes it more challenging to learn from. We find, however, that firms experienced in 
acquiring abroad in their core business are able to benefit from their experience with related 
acquisitions more easily. 
Overall, research presented in this thesis contributed to understating the process by 
international expansion of acquisitions by looking at both their frequency and successfulness. 
It also shed some light on the problems of why firms misattribute their experiences 
(overconfidence) and what they misattribute.  
On a more practical note, the results of this thesis seem to suggest that companies 
should be aware that it takes time to develop all the necessary routines, especially the skill of 
attributing experiences as well ad linking actions to outcomes correctly. Companies could also 
consider starting their international expansion in their core business or with something fairly 
familiar to them. Finally, companies should be careful, not overestimate their skills, actively 
search for signals from their environment that could verify their performance and should not 








5.2. Limitations and future research 
 
Much future research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms of learning to acquire 
abroad from various types of firms' own experience which also marks the limitations of this 
thesis. 
First of all, problems analyzed in this thesis, including how firms learn from their prior 
experience and why they misattribute and misgeneralize, are the types of problems that would 
call for a multilevel study. Studies linking the data on managerial perception (and for example 
impact of their demographics, the diversity of the TMT, its prior experiences) and the actual 
behavior of a firm would clearly add to our understanding of the problem of why exactly 
firms increase their frequency of international expansion when they are not prepared for it, 
what exactly do they misinterpret, what is the hardest for them to transfer when learning.  
Secondly, this research has focused solely on international acquisitions. Another 
fruitful area for future research could be to analyze the mechanism of learning for other types 
of foreign markets entry modes. Moreover, company’s own expansions are not the only 
source of company’s experience. Future research analyzing other potential sources of 
organizational experience (like for example experience of other companies in a given market 
and or industry) and how organizations learn to apply the lessons from these experiences to 
their international acquisitions, would clearly add to the thesis.  
Thirdly, the combination of frequency and success used in this study to derive 
conclusions regarding the hypothesized organizational learning effects lies on an assumption 
that increased frequency of international expansion by acquisitions is the consequence of 
organizational learning. Increased frequency of international expansion by acquisitions could 
be alternatively treated as a antecedent of organizational learning (implying that it is possible 
to learn and see the potential patterns only when doing things repeatedly). Another potential 
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criticism of the frequency is that although it takes firms down the learning curve faster, 
allowing for more trials and errors, it also reduces time to reflect. The three studies presented 
in this thesis confirm that increased frequency indeed reduces time to reflect and thus should 
not be undertaken by inexperienced companies, that need more time to consider their new 
experiences, which consequently decreases their performance. Future studies disentangling 
this possible effect would clearly add to our understanding of these processes. 
There is an old English expression: "once bitten, twice shy". This could suggest that a 
firm with bad prior experience will be less likely to acquire again. This could suggest that 
repeated expansion efforts could be driven by economic imperatives that are impervious to 
previous outcomes, i.e. learning is irrelevant when a firm has decided ex ante that it needs to 
expand, no matter what the cost. Alternatively, some firms might be much more selective in 
their choice of expansion targets, but not change their routines for managing those targets. 
Although some care was taken to possibly rule out this possibility by including the control 
variables and firms' fixed effects, additional measures could be applied (including for 
example Heckman correction models). 
Finally, despite the globalization trends (c.f. Hitt et al, 1998) firms originating from 
other institutional and cultural environments may differ in terms of their strategic behavior 
from Dutch firms, originating from relatively small, open economy. While other, for instance, 
European companies, may follow similar patterns, firms from countries with large domestic 
markets, less dependent on international business may differ considerably from the Dutch 
firms. Future research might shed light on relative importance of these differences and, 
therefore, the generalizability of the results of this thesis. Replicating this research in other 
national and industrial settings, as well as using different measures of acquisition 
performance, for example by analyzing the accounting and/or financial subsidiary level 
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performance data would help establishing to what extent our results are specific to the context 
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In een tijdperk van snelle technologische vooruitgang en grote politieke en 
economische veranderingen wereldwijd (Barkema, Baum & Mannix, 2002, Ghoshal, 1987, 
Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997) wordt het vermogen internationaal te werven een belangrijke 
vaardigheid voor bedrijven die zich willen uitbreiden in het buitenland. Internationale fusies 
en overnames winnen snel aan belangrijkheid omdat deze bedrijven op de snelste manier 
tastbare en niet-tastbare bezittingen verschaffen in diverse landen (Cartwright & Cooper, 
1993, Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998). Dat is ook de reden waarom we gedurende het laatste 
decennium de grootste groei in internationale productie via internationale overnames en fusies 
hebben waargenomen (UNCTAD, 2000). Echter, vanwege problemen met het coördineren en 
herconfigureren in een internationaal netwerk, het overbrengen van “best practice” tussen 
eenheden, het vasthouden van belangrijk personeel en het uitwisselen van informatie tussen 
geografisch verspreide bedrijfseenheden  (Anderson, Havila & Salmi, 2001, Cannella & 
Hambrick, 1993, Sirower, 1997) mislukken veel internationale overnames of zijn de 
resultaten beneden verwachting (Bergh, 2001, Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992, Donaldson, 
1990, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992, Jensen, 1988, Markides & Oyon, 1998, Porter, 1987, 
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). 
 Er is veel onderzoek gedaan naar de voorwaarden waaronder internationale overnames 
succesvol kunnen zijn. Belangrijk zijn onder andere hoe de bieder en het doel gerelateerd zijn 
(Donaldson, 1990, Lubatkin, 1983, Flanagan¸ 1996, Flangan & O’Shaughnessy, 2003, 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999, Hayward, 2002, Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992, Matsusaka, 1993, 
Maquieira et al., 1998, Morck et al., 1990), de motieven van bedrijven die een overname 
willen doen (Amihud & Lev, 1981, Baumol, 1967, Chatterjee, 1986, Dundas & Richardson, 
1980, Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, Hill & Hoskisson, 1987, Marris, 1964, Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987, Roll, 1986, Williamson, 1963) en eerder opgedane ervaring met 
overnames (Burton, Oviatt & White, 1994, Fowler & Schmidt, 1989, Hayward, 2002, Hitt et 
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al., 1998, Lahaey & Conn, 1990, Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001, Zollo & Singh, 2002). 
Hoewel het tegenwoordig algemeen geaccepteerd is dat het leren van overname-ervaringen 
één van de belangrijkste manieren is om succesvolle routines voor het doen van overnames te 
bouwen, is ons begrip van welke ervaringen nuttig kunnen zijn voor bedrijven die een 
overname willen doen en op welke manier deze bedrijven gebruik maken van eerdere 
ervaringen beperkt. De drie studies die in dit proefschrift worden gepresenteerd dragen bij aan 
de literatuur door deze kwesties expliciet te behandelen. Om te begrijpen hoe organisaties 
leren van hun ervaringen is het niet alleen van belang om de performance van hun overnames 
in ogenschouw te nemen, maar ook het aantal overnames.  
 In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we geanalyseerd welke ervaringen nuttig kunnen zijn voor 
bedrijven die een overname willen doen in het buitenland. Daarbij onderzoeken wij hoe 
bedrijven deze ervaringen leren te gebruiken. Gebaseerd op een analyse van ervaringen met 
nationale en internationale overname alsmede met buitenlandse joint ventures hebben we 
geconcludeerd dat bedrijven die succesvol een overname willen verrichten, twee soorten 
routines ontwikkeld moeten worden (zie Levitt & March, 1988). De eerste soort (relatief 
gemakkelijk en snel te bouwen) leidt tot een efficiënter proces van internationale uitbreiding 
door overnames en daardoor tot een hogere frequentie van overnames in het buitenland. Het 
tweede type routiniseert het proces van welke routines toegepast zouden moeten worden op 
welke problemen en onder welke omstandigheden. We vonden dat wanneer bedrijven die 
internationaal uitbreiden deze twee routines niet met elkaar kunnen verbinden (hetgeen 
gebeurt wanneer de bedrijven onervaren zijn), het prestatieniveau van de aangekochte 
eenheden daalt. Wanneer bedrijven het tweede soort routine (naast de efficiency routines) 
ontwikkelen dan zijn ze in staat het succes van hun buitenlands aangekochte eenheden te laten 
vergroten.   
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In hoofdstuk 3 trachtten we een antwoord te geven op de vraag waarom bedrijven de 
frequentie van overnames in het buitenland verhogen terwijl ze niet voldoende uitgerust zijn 
en voldoende kennis hebben om dit te doen. We hebben aandacht geschonken aan 
verschillende vormen van vooringenomenheid door managers (waaronder “self-serving bias” 
en “illusion of control”) voor verschillende niveaus van overname-ervaring. We vonden dat 
de onderschatting van problemen en overmoedige managers hebben geleid tot een stijging van 
het aantal overnames per jaar en daardoor ook tot een hogere kans op kostbare fouten en 
mislukte overnames. We hebben ook waargenomen dat wanneer de gecumuleerde problemen 
en geannuleerde overnames niet langer genegeerd kunnen worden, bedrijven hun 
overnamedrift temperen om te kunnen leren en hun ervaringen te analyseren. Na de 
temporisatie kan het aantal overnames in het buitenland weer stijgen naar hogere waarden dan 
daarvoor, maar dan wel een hogere succesratio. Dat mechanisme is valide voor het leren van 
eerdere ervaring met internationale overnames en internationale greenfields. 
 Tenslotte hebben we ons in hoofdstuk 4 gefocust op één bepaald type overname, 
namelijk de internationale horizontale overname. We hebben dit gedaan om te ontdekken hoe 
bedrijven leren succesvol te zijn in het geval dit type overname wordt toegepast. Om uit te 
vinden waarom het moeilijk is voor bedrijven om hun eigen ervaringen te begrijpen, hebben 
we onze aandacht toegespitst op zowel de ervaring die is gebruikt als het soort overname 
waarop deze ervaring is toegepast. We baseerden ons daarbij op het idee dat bedrijven maar 
één ding tegelijkertijd kunnen leren. Daarbij hebben we geanalyseerd wat de effecten zijn 
internationaal horizontale en internationaal gerelateerde overnames voor verschillende 
niveaus van ervaring op de frequentie en prestaties van horizontale overnames. We hebben 
beargumenteerd dat bedrijven die een international horizontale overname willen doen 
geconfronteerd worden met één niveau van complexiteit, namelijk de buitenlandse markten en 
culturen. Aan de andere kant hebben internationaal gerelateerde overnames tenminste twee 
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niveaus van complexiteit te weten nieuwe bedrijfsvoeringen en nieuwe buitenlandse culturen. 
We vinden echter dat bedrijven die ervaren zijn in buitenlandse overnames in hun core 
business makkelijker in staat zijn te profiteren van hun ervaringen met related acquisitions.  
 Over het geheel gezien draagt het onderzoek gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift bij aan 
het begrijpen van het proces van internationale uitbreidingen of overnames door te kijken naar 
zowel de frequentie als het succes van overnames. Het onderzoek verschafte ook enig inzicht 
in vragen als waarom bedrijven hun ervaringen verkeerd interpreteren (overschatting van 
zichzelf wordt toegeschreven aan de omstandigheden) en wat ze precies  verkeerd 
interpreteren. 
 Vanuit een praktischer oogpunt gezien lijken de resultaten van dit proefschrift te 
suggereren dat bedrijven zich bewust moeten zijn dat het tijd kost om alle noodzakelijke 
routines te ontwikkelen, vooral de vaardigheid van het correct interpreteren van ervaringen en 
het correct linken van acties en uitkomsten. Bedrijven zouden ook kunnen overwegen hun 
internationale expansie te beginnen in hun core business of in iets dat bekend is bij hen. 
Tenslotte zouden ondernemingen voorzichtig moeten zijn, hun capaciteiten niet moeten 
overschatten, actief moeten zoeken naar signalen uit hun omgeving die hun prestaties zouden 
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